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The study's purpose was to determine the influence of risk-taking 
and impulsiveness on criminal behavior, the factors' relationship to 
each other and their relationship, to age. It was hoped that the data 
would help explain the phenomenon of criminal burnout. Subjects were 
three groups of males aged 18 to 44, classed by their criminal history. 
Group One was 83 prisoners; group two, 53 subjects who had never been 
arrested; group three, 28 who had been arrested or incarcerated in the 
past, but who were not incarcerated at this time (the "erstwhile-
group). Measures utilized were the Self-control (Sc) scale from the 
California Psychological Inventory, Risk-taking (Rtg) and Infrequency 
(Inf) scales from the Jackson Personality Inventory, a modified Choice 
Dilemmas Questionnaire, the Impulsiveness (Imp) and Venturesomeness 
(Ven) scales from the Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, and Allsopp (1985) 1-7, 
and two behavioral measures: volunteering and cigarette smoking. 
Intercorrelations were computed over-all and by group; analyses of 
variance were performed on the three groups' scares on each measure. 
Impulsiveness and risk-taking were found to be related but separate 
concepts. Self-control (Sc), Imp, Ven, Inf and the two behavioral 
measures, volunteering and smoking, differentiated the three groups, 
with prisoners scaring significantly higher on Imp, Inf and risky 
behaviors than nonprisoners, and significantly lower on Sc. Causal 
inferences about the influence of impulsiveness on criminal behavior are 
supported by the erstwhile group's scores, which fall between the 
prisoners' and never-arresteds' scores. Causal inferences are further 
iv 
supported by the significant positive relationship of impulsiveness to 
the individual's total number of arrests, and the significant negative 
relationship between self-control and total number of arrests, also on 
the significant correlation between Imp and amount of time elapsed since 
last arrest. Venturesomeness differentiated the three groups in an 
unexpected manner. The erstwhile group was the significantly higher 
scorer, suggesting a transformation of impulsiveness into less 
antisocial responses are 1) occurring, and 2) adaptive. Risk-taking had 
nearly a zero relationship to age. Impulsiveness is related to age in 
only one case: the group who had never been arrested significantly 
decrease in impulsiveness with age. This is not the case with prisoners 
or erstwhiles whose impulsiveness was found to decrease not with age but 
with other salient factors such as number of arrests and amount of time 
since last arrest/release. These findings suggest not only the critical 
involvement of impulsiveness in criminality, but also point to the 
developmental nature of this crucial quality. The value of these 
findings is their potential use in crime prevention and criminal 
rehabilitation. (146 references.) 
v 
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Risk-Taking, Impulsiveness, and the Age-Crime Relationship 
This paper addresses specific areas of the current problem of ever-
rising crime rates in an effort to discover remedies. It does seem that 
effective remedy would require some knowledge about cause. To clarify this 
assertion, an analogy would be a severe problem from a disease and the need 
for creating an effective vaccine. This process would, among other things, 
require specifying and isolating a germ or virus as the target for 
intervention and alterations. Unfortunately causes of crime are difficult 
to isolate. This is true partly because of the variety of acts which fall 
under the rubric "crime," and also because of changing definitions of crime. 
Continuing the physical illness-infection analogy, it is as if treatment 
as been directed at the entire limb when only the large toe is infected. It 
is possible intervention has been directed to an entire segment of society 
Call the poor, or all youth, for example) when only a small portion of that 
segment is actually infected. This wastes precious resources and is 
largely ineffective treatment. In attempting to eliminate the necessity for 
crime, our society has raised the minimum wage, upgraded ghettoes, 
integrated its races, created programs directed at the children of the poor, 
and legislated equality in education and in employment practices. Over-all, 
society appears to be healthier, yet crime has skyrocketed. 
Crime, whatever its definition, is committed by people, and logic 
dictates that people commit crime for the same reasons they do everything 
else. There is a desired goal accompanied by learned goal-achieving 
behavior believed to be rewarding, and the perceived costs of the goal-
- 1 -
directed behavior are not sufficient to inhibit it. In support of this 
analysis is Hirschi's (1986) definition of criminality as "adherence to the 
pleasure principle." 
Current methods of criminal treatment are apparently ineffective. This 
is attested to by the continuing increase of crime. Yet massive public 
support is required for any changes in the deeply traditional system of 
crime prevention and correction. Securing such support seems to require 
explainers and/or predictors of crime which are not only found empirically 
to be accurate, but also to have face validity from the perspective of the 
ordinary citizen. 
In researching crime, two primary correlates consistently emerge. They 
are an individual's past history of offending, and his (see Footnote 1) age 
(Bartol, 1980i Blumstein & Cohen, 1982; Cline, 1980; Furnham, 1985; Hirschi 
and Gottfredson, 1983; Hirschi & Hindelang, 1977; Hoffman & Beck, 1984; Rowe 
& Tittle, 1977 [see Footnote 2) ). 
The age factor seemed most intriguing since there is a well known 
pheno~enon, referred to as criminal burnout, which is age-related and which 
seems promising for producing clues to resolving the critical social 
problem of soaring crime rates. In criminal burnout, an individual with a 
history of offending simply ceases to be arrested. No matter how long the 
history of criminal behavior, around the late thirties and early forties 
they desist from being arrested. This is not exactly the same as declaring 
they desist from crime. That debate is not resolved. However, all that is 
needed for the current study is the curious fact that for reasons unknown, 
people stop committing crimes on a fairly predictable schedule. 
- 2 -
Three age-related areas seem open to exploration. The first is the 
strong relationship of age to the onset of crime; second is the relationship 
of age to varying types of crimes; and third, the discontinuance of criminal 
offending by a certain age. 
The ability to predict criminality is classified by Glueck and Glueck 
(1972) as "the most fruitful concept to have emerged in the history of 
criminology" <p. 1). Yet a predictor variable superior to past history has 
not been found <Hoffman & Beck, 1983). It seems, though, that this method 
is analogous to predicting who will fly an airplane based upon who has 
flown one in the past. While around 16 years old is the peak age for 
committing offenses, the vast majority of 16-year-olds who commit an 
original offense are never again arrested. In the same way that knowledge 
of which pilots plan to fly at a particular point in time is necessary for 
air traffic controllers, accurate identification of the teen-agers who will 
commit more crimes is necessary for prevention of further criminal 
behavior. If this exploration should lend greater understanding of the 
criminal act, it could also be helpful in rehabilitation of offenders. 
Some professionals who work with young offenders, such as judges, 
policemen and correctional personnel, claim that they do know in advance 
which ones will be back in the system. The problem is that most feel 
nothing can be done to positively change this "predestination." The Gluecks 
(1937/1966) asserted the observable quality that differentiates the 
repeaters is always imbedded in a psychiatric diagnosis <p. 205). Their 
theory has been partially supported by several studies finding a 
preponderance of psychiatric diagnoses in incarcerated popUlations. But the 
- 3 -
exceptions, offenders without clinical diagnoses, weaken their argument, it 
seems. The psychiatric disorders may, as well, be responsible for the 
incarceration (apprehension and inadequate defense) more than for the 
crime. 
There have been no empirical studies of the accuracy of these data as 
predictors. One problem is that the qualities differentiating the young 
person who will reappear in the criminal justice system from one who will 
not have not been well elucidated. There are broad descriptors of these 
young people gleaned from conversations with professional juvenile workers, 
descriptors such as "troublemaker," "he mouths off," "disrespectful," "bad." 
Hopefully, a method which would help identify these at-risk young persons 
would also provide direction for the shaping of interventions. 
For at least 150 years (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983) a relationship 
between age and crime has been found empirically. Age is the most powerful 
correlate of crime. The highest incidence of original offenses is in the 
teens, peaking around 17 to 19. It sharply drops over the next two or 
three years, then slowly declines until around the mid-thirties, after which 
age few crimes are committed (see Figure 1). Moberg's (1953) finding that 
no more crimes were occurring with increases in the aged population is, in 
part, a confirmation of the criminal burnout phenomenon. The Gluecks 
(1937/1966, 1972) felt so strongly about the age-crime relationship that 
they wrote that if a man had not yet done with offending by age 36, it was 
likely he would never be. Hoffman and Beck (1984) quote from a 1964 
National Parole Institute publication: "One of the most firmly established 
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pieces of statistical knowledge is that the older a man is when released 
from prison, the less likely he is to return to crime" (p. 617). 
Yet the age-crime relationship, like the past history-crime link, is an 
unsatisfying predictor of who is likely to commit crime. The dilemma for 
investigators of the age-crime relationship is that neither variable can be 
directly manipulated. Nevertheless, it seems possible to dissect the 
powerful relationship between age and crime into more specific and 
empirically testable components. The goal is to isolate an accurate 
predictor of crime, with the added possibility that the factor also might 
be more accurately descriptive of criminal behavior, even explanatory. If 
this were the case, both rehabilitative and preventive efforts might be 
enhanced. 
Age as the Primary Correlate Of Criminal Behavior 
In addition to the correlation between age and incidence of crime, age 
has been intriguingly related to type of offense. Cline (1980) found the 
peak age for committing the crimes of vandalism, motor vehicle theft, arson, 
burglary and larceny was 16.9-18.3 years of age. For stolen property 
charges, narcotics, violence, assault, weapons charges, and sex offenses the 
peak age was between 20.0 and 25.9. Alcohol-related'offenses dominated the 
middle-aged population. 
Another age-related change in criminal behavior is discussed by KcGuire 
and Priestley (1985). They report that as offenders grow older they tend 
to become loners. Younger offenders tend to commit offenses in company. 
The following are the pertinent statistics from KcGuire and Priestley : 
- 6 -
Ag.e. Sole. ~ Groups 
10-14 36.5 36.1 25.4 
15-16 41.0 29.5 29.5 
17-20 62.8 24.4 12.8 
45+ 91.0 9.0 0.0 
McGuire and Priestly related risky shift, the tendency of groups toward 
riskier propensities than lone individuals, to crime and, utilizing the 
above statistics, they further related it to age. An example of the 
application of potentially useful inferences one can make from such 
findings is that, probably, a crime which required collusion was committed 
by younger persons. Another inference one might pullout of the McGuire 
and Priestley statistics for application is that a crime involving high 
risk would be more likely to have been committed by a younger person. 
Physical-Chemical Changes Associated With Age 
Age represents any changes found to occur in a person over the passage 
of time. It is a surprisingly complex concept to define. The first element 
of age to be considered, the most obvious, is the various physical changes 
occurring in an individual over time. These are possibly associated with 
wrinkles, slower gait, less erect posture, a pervasive quieting of behavior, 
and slowing of responses .. Some changes of age, such as organic damage and 
biochemical depletion, res~lt in diminished or constricted motor and 
cognitive responses. Others changes are found to increment or fine-tune 
these. An example is the observable improvement in motor and cognitive 
performance accompanying practice and experience. 
There is a strong possibility that criminal behavior declines for no 
more reason than that the criminal's body loses its agility. The body and 
biochemical cognitive functions become incapable of the type of performance 
- 7 -
crime requires. Extending that idea, it is also possible that awareness of 
these age impairments precipitates cognitive and behavioral changes which 
then leads to abandoning criminal behavior. 
No evidence, however, supports the relationship of physical impairment 
to ceasing criminal behavior. Furthermore, age-related physical impairments 
were found to involve changes which occur much later in the lifespan than 
the points associated with criminal activity--the late teens and then the 
mid-thirties. 
One exception to the relatively late-occurring physical-biochemical 
changes is the testosterone involvement. There was ample evidence of its 
effect on crime-related behaviors, especially aggression, ranging from the 
historical practice of castration as punishment and reports of its crime-
reducing side effects (Hawke, 1950j LeMaire, 1956) to the most recent 
publications, such as the August 1987 issue of Dmni. Dmni reported Dabbs' 
(1987) findings of significantly higher testosterone levels in violent 
offenders than other types of offenders. There are additional studies 
impressively linking testosterone to crime such as Selmanoff, Goldman, 
Maxson and Ginsberg (1977), who, in animal studies, found testosterone to 
be significantly involved in aggression, but only in the young animal. 
Witkin et al. (1976) has also linked testosterone to crime by way of their 
XYY chromosomal studies, finding that the XYY subject had higher 
testosterone levels and higher crime rates. While the interpretation of 
these findings are still controversial (especially concerning the criminal 
behavior criteria), the testosterone link to crime was implied. 
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Internal and External Factors Correlated With Crime 
Most investigations of crime have focused on social and environmental 
influences such as educational opportunity, housing, poverty, unfair 
employment practices, and racial-cultural discrimination. The predominantly 
sociological focus of research has persisted through the early 20th Century, 
until quite recently. There is-a lot of research with findings suggesting 
that the gigantic societal changes resulting from such a focus 
paradoxically might be said to have facilitated criminal behavior, since 
this is exactly what has happened. Investigation of heredity-genetics, 
traits-personality, or other representations of individual differences 
(composing a necessary crime component--the individual offender> have 
received much less attention until recently (e.g., Wilson and Hernstein, 
1986). 
Changing from exploring the external influences on criminal behavior 
was Megargee (1977a, 1977b, 1977c) who has done a massive work 
categorizing MMPI profiles of prisoners in order to isolate individual 
predictors of crime. He found ten major profiles representing different 
personality types, and several minor configurations. The problem seen to 
emerge at this point is that all of those classifications still covered only 
about half of the prisoner population he studied. This information 
suggests a great diversity in offenders' personality profiles. It suggests, 
too, that use of this method of analysis for intervention might be 
inefficient. It seems vastly more profitable to search for specific 
characteristics which might appear predictably in these varied profiles. 
- 9 -
Some theorists and researchers have viewed crime as a phenomenon 
composed of individual differences and situational influences. Some who 
have encouraged exploration of these interacting multifactor conditions as 
they influence criminal behavior include Bandura (1973), Bartol (1980), 
Cornish and Clarke (1985), Eysenck (1964, 1977). McGuire and Priestley 
(1985), and Rotter (1966). It is easy to understand how the complexities 
of investigating an event consisting of masses of varying internal and 
external factors have produced complex theories but little scientific 
research. 
In the only study comparing prisoners to nonprisoners found from a 
survey of 15 years' publications, Fodor (1973) operationalized Kohlberg's 
(1963) moral development model. Clear differences in moral development 
were established between offenders and nonoffenders. It seems that such 
individual differences between these groups promise to produce, at least. 
clues to a descriptor variable which will be more accurate than age. 
Perhaps they will also point to factors which could become predictors. 
A theory of changing scale scores as reflectors of changes in specifi~ 
qualities being related to offending would require first of all that 
differences in scores in scales measuring that quality be established 
between offender and non offender groups. Secondly, causal inferences as 
well as relationship statements might be made if the quality were found to 
change over time in nonoffender groups but not in offenders. Finally, a 
theory of relationship between levels of personality factors and criminal 
behavior and causal inferences would be strengthened by analyzing levels of 
those same qualities in a group of individuals who have offended in the 
- 10 -
past but who have not been arrested for a period of time. An example of an 
outcome which would strengthen both relationship statements and causal 
inferences would be that this erstwhile group's scores in specific scales 
change as a function of time elapsed since last arrest. Another possible 
finding that would strengthen both causal inferences and relationship 
statements would be that scores on the specific qualities appear to vary 
with number of arrests. 
An analysis of standardization data for widely used questionnaire-type 
psychological inventories (the California Psychological Inventory [CPIl, 
Jackson Personality Inventory [JPIl, and the Sixteen Personality Factors 
assessment [16PFl ) found several qualities or scales where offenders and 
nonoffenders differ. Examples are the CPI's Sociality and Self-Control 
scales, and the JPI's Responsibility scale. The group means on various 
scales reported for high school students (approximate ages 14-17) were 
compared to those of college age students (approximate ages 18-22), then to 
graduate students (approximate ages 23-30), and finally to an over-all 
sample labeled "normals." Progressive differences were apparent. Quite 
importantly, the CPI data included results from various offender groups: 
troublesome students, juvenile delinquents, and adult prisoners. Not 
surprisingly these groups exhibited similarities to one another and 
differences from nonoffender groups on intuitively relevant scales. 
Two qualities, represented by the CPI label "Self-control <Sc)" with its 
reciprocal "impulsiveness," and the JPI's "Risk-taking," appear to change 
over time (with age) in normal populations but not in offender populations. 
Age differences were also found in data from the 1-7 Impulsiveness 
- 11 -
Questionnaire (Eysenck, 1985), especially in the Impulsiveness scale. 
Impulsiveness and risk-taking seem logically to be related to crime. There 
is, in addition, a fair amount of existing data concerning these two 
qualities, some of which has already established a link to offending and 
criminal behavior. Another point regarding the choice of risk-taking and 
impulsiveness as the selected factors is an already-established link with 
general decision-making (Garratt, 1985; Ziller, 1957). This perspective or 
model is fundamental to the present study. 
The Objective in Criminal Risk-Taking: Crime Pays 
Both Ziller (1957) and Garratt (1985) assert that the dynamics of 
risk-taking are the same as those operating in any sort of decision-making. 
All behavioral decisions are based in large part on the individual's 
perceptions of payoffs and probabilities. Slavic and Lichtenstein (1968) 
separated risk-taking behavior into two components, payoffs and associated 
probabilities. Later, Slavic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1977) continued 
their investigation of risk-taking, but under the rubric of general decision 
theory. 
What all of this has to do with crime may become clearer when 
including the following information: In the state of Florida over the last 
three years, the crime clearance rate (see Footnote 3) has been reported at 
around 20 percent. The critical point made by these statistics is that, on 
the average, only two out of ten offenders are arrested. It is well known 
that even fewer are convicted. Feeney, Dill and Weir (1983) reported that 
30 to 60 percent of all robbery arrests are not convicted. Conversely, this 
means that 40 to 70 percent of robbery arrests are convicted. At the 
- 12 -
highest figure, 70 percent convicted of the 20 percent arrested means that 
about 14 percent of perpetrators of reported crimes are punished. The 
lowest figures make that number of "punished" crimes about 8 percent, and 
an even smaller number are imprisoned. With only 8 to 14 percent of 
reported robberies resulting in any sort of punishment for their 
perpetrators, the fact is that a whopping 86 to 92 percent of robbers are 
rewarded for their robbing behavior. 
In relating crime to decision-making theories, it is important to 
recognize that punishment for criminal behavior is not at all a sure thing. 
This becomes a critical point when considering Pearce-XcCall and Newman 
(1986). They found that when punishment was noncontingent (meaning 
inconsistent or not a sure thing), the expectancy of a successful outcome 
is increased. From a behavioral-learning perspective, current contingencies 
increase the probability of crime simply because eight or nine times out of 
ten it will be rewarded. If Pearce-McCall and Newman are considered, a 
criminal must proceed with a subjective assessment of nearly 100 percent 
chance of success. 
More consternating yet in its implications is Herrnstein (1967), who 
found that animal behavior is reinforced by any contingency less aversive 
than the expected one. If this dynamic generalizes to human subjects, then 
a criminal who is sentenced to a lighter penalty than he expects is 
paradoxically being rewarded for his criminal behavior. 
Summarize all of this information on the framework presented by 
Grasmick and Bryjack (1980). They found that severity of punishment had a 
weak or insignificant effect on deterrence, but the level of perceived risk 
- 13 -
of apprehension had a significant deterrent effect. All of these points 
together suggest that the effect of current arrest and incarceration rates 
on the crime rate are quite sinister. Greenberg (1981) emphasizes this by 
his conclusion that a low perception of punishment risk is the consequence 
of illegal behavior more than its cause. It seems that, whether examining 
crime as a behavior or as a cognitive act, the decision to commit crime may 
be usefully understood through a risky-choice model. 
Risk-taking as an Element of Crime 
Neal Shover (1983, 1985) and Cusson and Pinnsonneault (1985) all 
interviewed aging "reformed" criminals, inquiring about what had happened 
to change them. The "aging criminals" reported, in various ways, they had 
begun to think about all the aversive things that could happen, of what 
could be lost. Often they commented on their sudden awareness of the 
finiteness of time. What caused these changes in cognition? Could such a 
change be inculcated? Almost all the exprisoners interviewed answered 
questions about why they changed in terms easily translated to risk. They 
spoke of things to be lost in consequence of their behavior, both material 
things and nonmaterial. 
Risk-taking sometimes appears to be a quality varying between 
individuals but also within the same individual from time to time. This is 
seen, for example, in the Kogan and Wallach (1964) studies of risk-taking 
in groups. Yet psychometrists, such as Jackson (specifically in the JPI), 
see risk-taking as a fairly stable quality of the individual. In most 
studies risk-taking emerges as a purely situational response. One example 
is Aschenbrenner (1984), who found risk preference (the amount of risk an 
- 14 -
individual is comfortable with) to be a function of the task rather than a 
stable or specific behavior. His finding was that risky choice was more 
influenced by situation than by any individual trait or tendency. Finally, 
some theorists such as Cohen, Sheposh and Hillix (1979) and, more recently, 
XcGuire and Priestley (1985), conclude that risk-taking and criminal 
behavior can only be understood as being a variable result of the 
interaction between an individual and the situation. Paternoster, Saltzman, 
Waldo, and Chiricos (1982) concluded that the critical dynamics of risk-
taking are an internal perception and evaluation of external factors. 
Crozier (1979), in a review of risk-taking literature, likewise concluded 
the primacy of subjective evaluation and perception in risk-taking. 
Felsenthal (1979) found that all his subject risky choices were made 
independent of past experience, supporting the strong situational nature of 
risk. One conclusion drawn from the present review is that the quality of 
risk-taking appears to be extremely variable within an individual (from 
time to time) which, nevertheless, remains fairly fixed in its boundaries or 
limits, perhaps only to be exceeded in extreme external conditions. 
Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein (1980) established three types of bias in 
risky decision-making due to the following: (1) the effects (on the 
individual) of the outcome range (their perception of externals); (2) a 
preference for co-variance <individual limits of comfortability with 
subjective perception of externals); and (3) inconsistencies in assessments 
from different sources (distortion of individual perception and response 
due to external influences). Their work indicated at least three separate 
areas involved in a risky decision--potential outcomes, individual 
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preferences, external information. Implicitly included here is the 
individual's capacity to evaluate and respond. 
The establishment of what appear to be universal biases involved in 
risk-taking imply the predominance of individual factors. An example of 
one of these was the Kahneman and Tversky (1984) finding that people tend 
to overweight probabilities toward either extreme. Metzger (1985) also 
found apparent universal biases. She posits "the gambler's fallacy," which 
is actually composed of three separate errors in subjective assessment. 
The first, she says, is an increasing risk preference over the course of a 
day (or longer, assumably). The second element is an insensitivity to 
actual contingencies. The third is a tendency to contradict expert opinion. 
In summary, Van den Haag (1982) appears to state well what is shown be 
the foregoing studies. He suggests that the two areas to target for change 
are: (1) decreasing expectancy of profit for crime as compared to lawful 
activity, and (2) increasing the perception of probability of apprehension 
consequent to criminal activity. Waldo and Chiricos (1971) earlier 
published the same conclusions. 
Problems With Rjsk-taking as Primary variable 
Risk-taking was an excellent factor for study since there is a great 
deal of literature explicating it. However, transposing some of those 
findings onto risk-taking as it occurs in criminal acts began to be 
troublesome. Examples are Levinger and Schneider (1969) and Williams 
(1965). Both these studies found that people admire a position more risky 
than their own. Wallach and Wing (1968) found that risk was culturally 
valued and Chapko (1973) found that it was a norm in our society to be 
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risky. These ideas do not fit neatly with a study of risk-taking as a 
primary factor in criminal behavior. 
As is the case with many psychological factors, risk-taking turns out 
not always to be a negative quality. In fact, in many areas of everyday 
life risk-taking is a valued asset. It is desired in managers to the extent 
that much expensive training is employed to facilitate it. Xany studies of 
risk-taking surveyed for this review were published in business and 
managerial publications (Morris, 1966; Sisson, 1985; Taylor, 1974; Ziller, 
1957). The purpose of these publications was either to identify risk-
takers in order to assess vocational fitness, or to refine the skill of 
risk-taking for managerial decisions. 
Some studies, such as Roswal and Frith (1980), demonstrate another 
positive aspect of risk when they outline methods of using an individual's 
innate risk-taking propensity to facilitate various therapies. There are 
also socially desirable risk-taking behaviors, such as introducing oneself 
to a stranger or initiating conversation. Standing up for an unpopular 
belief is an American value, and it is risky. One of mankind's most 
desirable and valued qualities, courage, is also risk-taking. 
Risk-taking is a quality paradoxically valued as both desirable and 
undesirable. Xaking the emergent dichotomy more complex, it seems that 
desirability apparently depends on some pretty vague variables, having 
mainly to do with invisible forces: motives. For example, a risky act, 
such as walking along a narrow ledge of a building ten stories in the air, 
can be--depending only on its motive--praised or punished. If it is done 
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in order to save a child, it is praised. If it is done in order to commit a 
robbery, it is despised. 
It became obvious that the dual nature of this factor, risk-taking, 
could cost precious accuracy in research and effectiveness in application if 
operationalizations are not particularly attended to. Motives, however, are 
extremely difficult to operationalize. 
In summary, it seems that risk-taking has elements which tend to 
prosocial as well as antisocial application and this division can be the 
source of error. 
Impulsiyeness; A More Narrowly Defined Variable 
On consideration, impulsiveness, whether defined by a low self-control 
score or as being the opposite of reflectivity (Eysenck), has no prosocial 
connotation at all in the literature outside of a possible synonym for 
Rogerian spontaneity. Therefore, this factor was selected as stating more 
clearly and accurately the abstract principle visualized in risk-taking as 
being related to criminal behavior. 
Consequent to illuminating the dichotomy of prosocial and antisocial 
risk-taking, and consequent to deciding to incorporate a study of 
impulsiveness, one major task of the current study is exploring the 
relationship between risk-taking and impulsiveness, as well as the 
relationship of each of these to crime. O'Keefe (1979) concluded from 
results of a comparison of 40 impulsive and 40 nonimpulsive children that 
there was no significant relationship between the two factors, risk-taking 
and impulsiveness. Jackson's <JFI Manual) definition of risk-taking is 
given by trait adjectives of high and low scorers. The high scorer on the 
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Risk-taking scale is described as " (r)eckless, bold, impetuous, intrepid, 
enterprising, incautious, venturesome, daring, rash." Megargee's (1972/Gough, 
CPI) description of the low scorer on self-control is "(Umpulsive, shrewd, 
excitable, irritable, self-centered, and uninhibited; aggressive .... " It 
appears the low self-controlled (impulsive) individual possesses traits of 
the high risk-taker which are generally deemed negative, illustrated in the 
descriptors "reckless," "incautious," and "rash." 
Other sources explicating impulsiveness include Thornton (1985), who 
reported finding it to be composed of two elements: (1) a high risk-taking 
tendency, and (2) a tendency not to evaluate risk before acting. Eysenck 
(1964) defines impulsiveness in terms of lacking reflectivity; Friis and 
Knox (1972) define it as the opposite of planfulness. Megargee 
(1972/Gough, CPI) defines it as the opposite of self-control. Oas (1985) 
defines impulsiveness as "disordered behavior occurring with (1) little or 
no premeditation, or (2) little or no psychological capacity for delay. Cas 
(1984) earlier had defined implusiveness by the DSM-III criteria for 
attention deficit disorder, which encompasses both the definition of 
planfulness and that of self-control. Chaplin's Dictionary of Psychology 
(Chaplin, 1975) defines impulsiveness as "a more or less chronic tendency 
to act on impulse or without reflecting upon the consequences of action." 
Bartol's (1980) definition of impulsiveness as "the inability to delay 
gratification" reinforced Mischel (1961), Quay (1965), Ross and Grossman 
(1974), and Stumphauzer (1973) I all of whom concluded the same. It also 
begins to relate Hirschi's (1986) pleasure-principle definition of crime to 
this study of impulsiveness. All of these researchers and theorists have 
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concluded that a key component of impulsiveness is the inability to delay 
gratification. Mischel and Gilligan (1964) long ago established the link 
between dishonest behavior and a preference for immediate gratification. 
Thompson. Teare. and Elliott (1983). in a review which included studies 
of impulsive children's characteristics. set them forth as follows: 
1. Global search-and-scan strategyj 
2. Poor selective attentionj 
3. Low anxiety over errors; 
4. Aggressive social behaviorj 
5. Immaturity of moral reasoning; 
6. Externalized behavior problemsj and 
7. Deficient reading skills. 
Two of the descriptors isolated by Thompson. Teare. and Elliott. 
aggressive social behavior and immaturity of moral reasoning. are 
especially relevant to this study of impulsiveness as it relates to crime. 
Waugh (1984) performed a factor analysis on a set of self-control-
impulsiveness measures. He, like Gough, visualized these t~o qualities as 
the extreme poles of a dimension or quality. and concluded the following: 
"The phenomena of self-control or impulsivity were shown to be 
multidimensional even within same-sex subjects. Only one of the variables, 
delay of gratification, reflected specific developmental variance." The 
first point relevant to this study that Waugh makes is his acknowledgement 
of the vast potential for invalidity and unreliability in research by 
attesting to the multidimensional nature of impulsiveness. Secondly. he. 
too, isolates delay of gratification as a key component, suggesting further 
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it is the one component of impulsiveness-self control which fits a 
developmental model. If this is true, that acquisition of the ability to 
delay gratification fits a developmental model, any quality composed of the 
ability to delay gratification should also be found to significantly 
correlate with age, if only because of the passing of time is a necessary 
element of developmental processes. 
Finally, and highly pertinent to this present investigation, Eysenck 
(1985) has established the relationship of impulsiveness to age. 
Age as a Correlate QfRisk and Impulsiveness 
Changes Oyer Time 
The following composite of studies indicates change over time (as one 
ages) in the way individuals perceive and evaluate risk. The changes 
examined are admittedly gross and certainly related to other phenomena. 
However, they are valuable because they demonstrate firstly that there is, 
in fact, change. Secondly, they suggest the nature of this change. 
Sorce, Emde, Campos and Klinnert (1985) found that their subjects, 108 
12-month-old infants, referenced maternal facial expressions as their cues 
for risky behavior. Their outcome is made more powerful by the fact that 
ambiguous facial expressions, such as curiosity and interest, were 
referenced almost twice as often as the more easily interpreted 
expressions, joy and anger. The very young child's search for information 
to make a risky decision is directed toward a specific, external, authority 
figure and such decisions are almost universally based on cues from those 
authority figures. 
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In a later phase, childhood, Arenson (1978) found no age or sex 
differences in game-playing risk-taking in a group of children aged 5 to 
13. In another study, Harrington and McBride (1970) found young males were 
"disproportionately likely to take risks" in social situations. These 
studies indicate changes are occurring concerning sex differences and 
differential situational responding. 
In the third phase, adolescence, Chassin et al. (1986) found their 
adolescent subjects referencing parents at one time, and their peers at 
another. However, in the areas they explored--risk-taking involved 
drinking and driving issues--Clark and Prolisko (1979) found that while 
parental attitudes and behaviors had some effect, peers were the critical 
cue senders. Their results imply, through the vacillation of source of 
influence, both that a change in source of influence occurs and, as well, 
the situational nature of risk-taking, manifesting at least by adolescence. 
Brownfield (1966) found, in studying optimal stimulation levels, that 
sensation-seeking (closely related to risk-taking) decreased with age in 
ev~ry group tested. 
Finally, as an ideal and in support of a model of progressive change, 
was Locander and Herman (1979). They conclude that self-confident adults, 
when considering risky choices, rely mainly on internal judgment. Only 
secondly do they rely on external sources, and then they are variable and 
not specific, 
Age as a Correlate of Impulsiyeness and Risk-Taking 
An early study linking age with risk-taking (Brownfield, 1966), found 
that sensation-seeking, closely related to risk-taking as defined by 
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Zuckerman (1964, 1968), decreased with age in all the groups he tested. 
More recently, Bragg and Finn (1985) found similarly that age is 
specifically related to individual perception of risk. Their study found 
that directing subjects to use a seatbelt increased their assessment of the 
dangerousness of a driving course. However, this effect was found only in 
younger subjects. Older subjects did not alter their assessments. the 
Bragg and Finn conclusions support the previously cited studies showing 
change in risky decision-making over the life span. 
Kishton, Starrett and Lucas (1984) performed a factor analysis of the 
Eysenck, Pearson, Easting and Allsopp instrument (1-7, 1985) utilized in the 
present study. A significant interaction of impulsiveness and age was 
apparent in adolescents, even within a narrow range of four years. The 
level of impulsiveness differentiated 14-year-olds from 18-year-olds. 
Relevantly, these ages are the same as those involved in the onset of 
criminal behavior. Also relevantly, these ages encompass the age when the 
majority of offenders desist from crime. 
Eysenck, Pearson, Easton and Allsopp (1985), investigating the validity 
of their 1-7, found a steady decline in Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness 
with age. A partial report of their age-group findings are as follows: 
Impulsiveness Venturesomeness 
Age. 11. ~ St.Dev. ~ St.Dev. 
16-19 73 9.84 4.13 11.51 3.34 
20-29 97 7.93 4.12 10.31 3.73 
30-39 69 7.06 5.20 7.25 3.70 
40-49 87 6.08 4.15 7.08 3.58 
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Since those data were derived from a "normal" population, the findings 
probably accurately represent what appears to be the "normal," progressive 
dimunition of impulsiveness and risk-taking with age. Possibly this 
process is the empirical representation of maturing or "growing up." The 
age differences seen in the Eysenck, Pearson, Easton, and Allsopp subjects 
are of the same nature as the differences between groups standardizing the 
CPI and the JPI. 
One important question the present study addresses is whether or not 
this apparently "normal" process of diminishing impulsiveness and risk-
taking with age holds in prisoner populations. Many professional workers 
observe prisoners as being immature, even child-like, in social 
interactions. An intriguing idea is that this apparent emotional-
psychological and behavioral immaturity is accompanied by a similar or 
related retardation of moral development. If this were found to be the 
case, crime remedies might be more efficiently formulated and targeted. 
Race or Culture as a Correlate of Risk-taking and Impulsiveness 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) reported finding significant differences 
between proportional representation of races in offender populations. The 
present study found likewise. In related work, Blumstein (1982) found that 
Black males in their 20s had an incarceration rate 25 times higher than 
that of the normal population. His exploration revealed that 80 percent of 
this disproprotionality was attributed to the higher criminal involvement 
of Blacks, especially in homicide and robbery. Blumstein's findings suggest 
that the prisoner population cannot produce a fair or representative or 
sample or generalizable findings due to 1) the unbalanced racial mix, and 
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2) the significant differences in many areas between the races. It is 
important to note that this means that findings from studies investigating 
individual characteristics probably cannot be accurately generalized to 
prisoner populations. Also important is the suggestion that findings from 
prisoner populations reflect only a mean, not the significantly different 
racial outcomes, which may be critical. The extent of such racial 
differences must be explored, it seems, in order to achieve more accurate 
data and produce more effective remedies for crime. 
As support for these statements, the establishes biases of assessment 
instruments are cited. Blacks have been found to do less well on 
traditional intelligence inventories, at least in part due to these 
instrument biases. It seems probable that the generally lower intelligence 
scores of prisoner populations are at least in part the result of the 
disproportionate number of Blacks in those populations. Rany personality 
assessments also have been found to be culturally biased (Goldman, 1977). 
Racial differences have been found in school children utilizing both 
intelligence and personality assessments (Goldman, 1977), in adolescents 
(Koore & Handal, 1980), and in adults (Cross & Burger, 1982), 
Since the current investigation utilizes the CPI, the publication by 
Cross and Burger (1982) of a demonstrated cultural bias in results from 
that instrument was especially pertinent. Because of all the above findings 
of racial differences, this study proposes to analyze its findings in the 
traditional manner, by considering the entire subject population, and then 
compare results of the two major racial groups. 
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Education. Intelligence. and Learning History as 
Cprrelates of Risk-Taking and Impulsiyeness 
Three concepts, education, intelligence, and learning history, will be 
considered by this investigation rather than intelligence alone. Critical 
elements related to criminal behavior are not adequately represented by the 
label intelligence alone. As intelligence influences the amount of education 
possible (as well as what is learned from experiences), so does amount of 
education influence scores of most intelligence assessments. 
Blaylock (1985), in a review, found three major variables in risk-
taking: the decision environment, information about parameters of 
alternative choices, and the individual's cognitive style. These appear to 
encompass learning history (responses to the decision environment), 
education (information about parameters) and intelligence (cognitive style). 
The interaction between cognitive style and impulsiveness on performance of 
memory tasks by children was explored by Siegel, Kirasic and Kilburg 
(1973). Reflective children performed a recognition task significantly 
better, appearing to be ,more intelligent. They also performed a more 
thorough and detailed feature analysis than impulsive children in their 
experiment. Differences between reflectives and impulsives, however, did 
not reach significance on the easy items. Only on the more complex items 
did the reflectives emerged as superior performers. This suggests that 
probably within a fairly wide range, intelligence and impulsiveness are not 
significant factors in problem-solving. 
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Each of the incorporated elements--intelligence, education, learning 
history--and their relationship to either risk-taking or impulsiveness will 
now be briefly surveyed. 
Intelligence 
While intelligence has been linked with criminality (or more accurately, 
apprehension-arrest and incarceration) (Heilbrun, 1982), no study was found 
relating it to ceasing to offend ("burnout"). Intelligence undoubtedly 
plays a part in impulsiveness. However, it seems to play quite different 
roles depending on whether the intelligence level is high or low. High 
intelligence is associated with more sensation-seeking or risk-taking. Low 
intelligence is associated both with being incarcerated and with higher 
impu lsi veness. 
Prentice and Kelly (1963) explored the connection between intelligence 
and delinquency, and included a review of 21 other studies. They found 
delinquents to be in the dull-normal range of verbal ability and in the 
normal range of performance. They discuss Wechsler, who found that profile 
so common in delinquency that he defined it by that criteria. Prentice and 
Kelly disagreed with Wechsler's conclusions, however. They felt the 
correlation was superficial, and that some problem other than intelligence, 
such as specific learning disabilities, could offer a more accurate 
explanation of both the profile and of delinquency. 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) found an association (r=-.21, p <.05) between 
verbal ability and risk-taking. This finding held only for males, it should 
be noted. They found no association at all between verbal ability and 
risk-taking in women. Since verbal ability is the area most often assessed 
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in measuring intelligence, Kogan and Wallach's findings suggest that 
intelligence has to do with risk-taking, but not much. 
Finding only a weak correlation between intelligence and risk-taking 
suggests possibly that some subjects with high intelligence have high risk-
taking propensity while others have low, and some with low intelligence 
likewise manifest high risk-taking and others, low. Therefore, it seems 
logical to search for a variable other than intelligence but related to it 
as a more accurate moderator of risk-taking. 
Because of the strong logical connection between intelligence and risk, 
and intelligence and impulsiveness, lack of empirical validation of this 
relationship is curious. Perhaps this state of affairs can be explained by 
research methods. Xost studies investigating this relationship utilize 
undergraduate populations, which are fairly homogeneous as to intelligence. 
As a matter of fact, most naturally occurring (meaning not experimentally 
created) groups probably will turn out to be homogeneous as to intelligence. 
This homogeneity in convenient populations could account for the consistent 
findings of insignificant correlation between impulsiveness or risk-taking 
and intelligence. 
Pertinent to the current study's attempt to establish the complexity of 
risk-taking (in order to further extricate and isolate the concept of 
impulsiveness) was the Wallach and Kogan (1965) finding that verbally able 
males with both high test anxiety and low defensiveness were significantly 
less risky. In their search for explication of risk-taking, Kogan and 
Wallach (1964) explored a complex interaction of factors, concluding that 
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an adequate definition required a combination of several variables. The 
variables they isolated were sex, intelligence, anxiety and defensiveness. 
Illuminating further the relationship of impulsiveness to intelligence 
were Friis and Knox (1972), who found IQ scores to be negatively related to 
impulsivity. Shure, Spivak and Jaeger (1971) found both aggression and 
delay of gratification to be negatively correlated with the level of 
problem-salving skills in preschool children. Messer (1970) found that 
impulsiveness declined with age in school children except in children who 
had failed a grade. These children's impulsiveness scores remained the 
same over the two and one half years of the study. Messer's findings 
support the link between learning disabilities and impulsiveness which Oas 
(1985) and others have found. 
On all tests of short-term memory in emotionally disturbed children, 
Finch, Edwards, and Searcy (1984) found correlations with impulsivity. 
They also found that in this disturbed group of children, reflectives did 
better than impulsives an memory tests. Memory deficits would be expected 
to produce poorer performance, or manifest as a learning disability, 
particularly on verbal ability-type intelligence assessments. 
Heilbrun (1982) found three models of impaired cognitive processing 
related to criminal violence: 
(1) Low IQ with associated poor impulse control; 
(2) Low empathy; and 
(3) Lack of inhibition against physical aggression due to poor 
socialization. 
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Especially relevant to the current study is Heilbrun's item (1), low 
intelligence with the "associated poor impulse control." While low 
intelligence might account for the other two factors Heilbrun isolated, 
these also can occur in the case of normal or high intelligence. Heilbrun 
expressed his belief that the criminal with low intelligence had a narrower 
range of "straight" alternatives. While this argument seems popular, it 
seems that such a narrowing of alternatives could exert little influence on 
whether or not a person decides to commit a crime since, in the case of low 
intelligence, the range of "crooked" alternatives also would be narrowed. 
Logically the connection of low intelligence with crime does not appear 
realistic. It seems that criminal acts, including unsuccessful criminal 
acts, would require as much thought as noncriminal alternatives. 
Furthermore, the level of intelligence required to learn inhibition against 
criminal activity is minimal. Behavioral studies have adequately 
demonstrated that all sorts of inhibitions can be taught, even to the 
severely retarded. If this were not the case, crime and retardation would 
be almost perfectly correlated. An example of this point is found in 
Hughes' (1985) study of learning disabled children and the effect of 
problem-solving skills training on their impulse control. In analyzing his 
methods, it seems that subjects simply were given more intensive training 
with the same methods and the same materials as was given to normal 
children. 
The Hughes (1985) study is highly relevant to the theme of the current 
investigation because he found, among other things, that impulse control 
was significantly increased in the intensive-training group. The study 
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becomes, in its entirety, an example of the low relevance of intelligence to 
the learning impulse inhibition. Vhil i e ntelligence and self-control, as 
measured by the CPI and reported in its standardization data, covary 
closely, Hughes and other behavioral studies suggest that intelligence may 
be a factor in crime (as in any behavior) only insofar as it hinders an 
individual's understanding of prohibitions or consequences. Intelligence 
may be found to contribute to violent crime insofar as it limits the 
individual's coping capabilities (the exceeding of which might lead to a 
violent response). Yet it has been demonstrated, especially by Hughes 
(1985) and Sowers, Verdi, Bourbeau and Sheehan (1985), that even severe 
intelligence limitations can be overcome with specific education/learning. 
In summary. it seems that individual intelligence level, within fairly 
wide boundaries, is not crucial to either criminality or to impulsiveness. 
but that persistence, intensity, and specialization of training-education 
are. In the case of impulsiveness, an individual's intelligence level may 
turn out to indicate little more than how intense training must be to 
accomplish the prescribed amount of learning to achieve impulse control. 
On the other hand, intelligence is probably accurately associated with 
incarceration, although not necessarily to criminal acts. As has been 
elsewhere noted, understanding of the relationship between intelligence and 
crime is critically limited since most testing on criminals is done on 
incarcerated persons who may not be a fair sample of intelligence levels. 
Education 
Risky shift is a phenomenon where members of a group become more 
risky--or less cautious--on a given issue over time. Wallach and Wing 
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(1968) and others have found that risky shift in groups occurs only after 
subjects exchange information. This implies that it is actually education 
or peer pressure fostering the change. 
One study exploring the effect of relevant education on risk-taking 
behavior was Schoemaker (1979). He compared the gambling behaviors of two 
groups of undergraduates--one group had completed a statistics course while 
the other had not. He found (1) that there was reduced cognitive 
complexity in the educated group when assessing duplex bets; (2) that the 
quality of risk assesment improved in the educated group; and (3) that the, 
educated group had significantly higher risk-taking based on a moment 
model (which has a situational basis). 
Another demonstration that even a small amount of specific education 
has a significant effect on risk-taking behavior is Duryea (1985). He 
found that a few hours of education over one week's time produced a 
significant reduction in risk-taking attitudes. Education also appears to 
be the critical component in the Sowers, Verdi, Bourbeau and Sheehan (1985), 
just discussed. They were successful in teaching self-control to a ,mentally 
retarded group by merely simplifying the learning steps and tailoring 
reinforcers. The outcome was significant improvement of self-control in 
the learning-impaired subjects. 
Summarizing studies illuminating the influence of education on 
impulsiveness or risk-taking, it seems likely that education (learning) and 
not intelligence is the key factor in impulsive or risky behavior change. 
Deterrence, after all, may turn out to be little more than a matter of 
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education, the learning of prosocial inhibitions, specifically tailored to 
specific learners. 
Learning History (What Has He Been Exposed TO and 
HoW Has He Learned to Respond?) 
The difficulty in separating learning history from education is 
considerable, and appears to have mainly to do with apparently random 
external press, or stimuli, the type and range of experiences, and the 
individual's models, all of which may turn out to be the same thing. In a 
discussion of the importance of learning history to impulsiveness, some 
serious implications emerge concerning individual responsibility. This 
responsibility rests specifically in the development of social cooperation, 
self-control, and compliance in children by their parents. One example of 
these implications is found in Honig (1985). He concluded in a review that 
there were three major factors of impulsiveness, all of which confirm the 
conclusions of studies cited earlier. The first major factor he isolates is 
child-rearing style; the second, infant-mother attachment; third is the 
presence of early compliance behaviors. 
Glueck and Glueck (1937/1972) posited similar factors for use in 
identifying future criminals while they were still small children. Kore 
recent experimental studies exploring the same factors include Rohrbeck and 
Twentyman (1986), who studied the children of abusing, neglecting, and 
normal mothers. They found the highest scores on all measures of 
impulsiveness were from children of abusing mothers. No other variables 
besides this child-raising style were found to produce significant 
differences in a child's impulsiveness. 
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Further support for the idea of impulsiveness' being to a large measure 
the result of child-raising style (learning) is Power and Chapieski (1986). 
They report that their results show individual diferences in impulse 
control are related to differences in child-discipline styles. 
It is certain that more than a single component of parenting methods, 
for instance punishment or nonpunishment, is involved in producing an 
impulsive child. Suggesting the idea that it is a pervasive attitude which, 
in part, underlies or includes a punishment component, is an additional 
finding by Power and Chapieski. They concluded from their data that 
physical punishers also made fewer objects available to their infants (who, 
incidentally, were found to be rated as generally less competent by this 
study). They also found that families who had their children in lower 
quality child care services also tended to be more distracted and less 
concerned with the child generally. It is allowed that the possible true 
source of all these negative behaviors and neglect is worried distraction 
by simply overburdened caretakers whose irritability also can result in 
cruelty to ~ child. Nevertheless, these findings support the general theory 
that impulse control is a learning product of specific parenting styles. 
That traditional abuse is not necessarily the culprit but the 
underlying attitudes allows for explaining those children who are not 
taught impulse control because either permissive, irresponsible parents as 
well as those who do not learn it due to overprotective parents. 
Supporting such a theory is the reality of a crime rate which has spiraled 
in spite of great advances made against poverty. This means that if 
distraction and neglect was primarily due to poverty, the crime rate would 
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have diminished as the minimum wage rose. Additionally, there is evidence 
that impulsive children tend to come from more advantaged homes. 
Relevant to this discussion, Curt Bartol (1980) asks: "Why does 
emotional upheaval and conflict in a home produce more delinquency than an 
emotionally stable one?" He then proceeds to answer the question by 
stating his conclusion that emotional instability in the home tends to 
produce children who have not witnessed a wide variety of socially 
desirable behavior; for example, an unavailable, abusive, or alcoholic 
father, and a neglecting mother. He adds that he believes that the 
breakdown of the modeling process is the real culprit. A powerful support 
for Bartol's assertions and this study's was the early work of Bandura and 
Xischel (1965) in establishing the importance of modeling to the process of 
a child's acquisition of the ability to delay gratification. 
Peer Influence as a Correlate of Risk-Taking and Impulsiyeness 
Duryea's (1985) study of the effect of education on risk-taking 
attitudes and behavior, discussed earlier, was designed to explore the 
influence of peer compliance on adolescents. Duryea's subjects were ninth-
grade students, aged around 15, in a group containing both boys and girls. 
These teen-agers did, in fact, demonstrate significantly reduced peer 
compliance after one week's instruction on the dangers inherent in the 
target situations. However, peer compliance in those risky situations was 
by no means eliminated, only diminished. This statistical reality stands 
alone as a strong argument for the power of peer pressure on risk-taking 
because compliance in risky situations was still strongly in evidence. 
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Studies utilizing the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) (Wallach & 
Kogan, 1961, 1964; Kogan & Wallach, 1965) found the risky shift phenomenon 
in groups occurred without exception when information was exchanged among 
group members (Felsenthal, 1979; Goethals and Demorest, 1979; Goethals and 
Zanna, 1979; Wallach and Xabli, 1970). Beyond the educational implications 
already discussed is the strong possibility that peer pressure, rather than, 
or in combination with, education is a causal influence in changing risky 
behavior. 
Roberts and Castore (1972) sought explication of the information 
eXChange factor and concluded that the risky shift was due more to 
compliance with peer pressure than any actual change of perspective. 
However, their study unearthed the involvement of yet another unspecified 
influence, which seems to be insufficiently explained under the heading of 
peer pressure. They found that in a group of four, a subject would become 
more risky if only one other person in the group took a riskier stand; 
however, subjects would not shift to a more conservative position unless all 
the other three had done so. 
There seems to be a change over the lifespan in the individual's 
receptivity to external influences. While peer influence appears powerful 
throughout life, it has been shown to be age-dependent, sex-dependent, 
education-dependent, and also to depend on the individual's level of self-
confidence. Additional studies investigating these relationships include 
Chassin, Presson, Montello, Sherman and McGrew (1986), who found the 
smoking behavior (which the authors classed as a risky behavior) of nearly 
4,000 sixth through eleventh graders depended equally on peer and parental 
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influences. Another related study Is Duryea (1985), who found drinking 
attitudes of ninth graders depended more on parental behavior than peers', 
but did incorporate both external influences. Finney (1984) also 
demonstrated the power of peer compliance in undergraduate subjects both in 
perception of risk and in actual volunteering behavior. 
Anxiety as a Correlate Of Risk-taking and Impulsiyeness 
A Kogan and Wallach (1961) study already cited in this paper in 
support of sex and other differences, found anxiety to be an influencer of 
risk-taking. They found that high test anxiety. high defensiveness and 
high verbal ability were the primary traits of the high risk-takers. In 
the same era O'Connor and Atkinson (1962) found an interactive effect of 
anxiety and risk which involve a third factor. need achievement. along with 
a reversal of the anxiety variable. They found high risk preference in 
subjects with a combination of high need achievement and low test anxiety. 
Gal-or, Tenenbaum, Furst and Shertzer (1985) analyzed risk performance 
in military parachute jump training. Surprisingly their findings suggest 
that the lack of anxiety does not improve performance. It was the 
individual's self-control making the difference, no matter what his level of 
anxiety was. Most importantly they found that neither anxiety nor self-
control exerted a single effect on performance. Significant effects were 
seen only in the interaction of the two traits. Subjects high in ~ 
anxiety and self-control were the best performers in an extremely risky 
behavior. The poorest performers were subjects who were high in anxiety 
but low in self-control. (To be noted here is the fact that the Gal-or 
study employed actual behavior as the dependent variable. which seems to be 
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reflecting a somewhat different phenomenon from that measured by pencil-
and-paper questionnaires.) 
Yap and Peters (1985) concluded that impulsiveness in children was 
slowed by anxiety over errors. Since risk-taking has been shown to be 
both increased and diminished by anxiety, according to what other factors 
are active, these Yap and Peters findings suggest that there are yet other 
explanations for the seemingly inconsistent effects. Anxiety may take 
different forms, such as anxiety over possible errors or some valuable 
contingency, or it simply varies in its effect according to its level. 
Other Variables Shown to Be Influential 
Some studies have linked internal-external locus pf cpntrol to risk-
taking and impulsiveness. Cohen, Sheposh and Hillix (1979) found that 
internals risked more than externals in gambling tasks requiring skill. 
This seems logical since someone attributing cause to personally 
controllable factors would tend to rely on his self-assessment of skills, 
while someone attributing cause to external factors would depend less on 
their own abilities. In line with. this reasoning, Cohen et al. found 
externals took greater risks based solely on chance than did internals. In 
an older study, Liverant and Scodel (1960) found internals' gambling 
behavior to differ significantly from externals'. The internals made bets 
in the intermediate range of amounts and probabilities. Demonstrating less 
over-all variability in all choices than externals, of the internals they 
studied, not one selected an extreme probability. Externals were more 
variable and extreme in their selections in both amounts and probabilities. 
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Kirschenbaum, Tomarken and Humphrey (1985) isolated another variable 
influencing impulsiveness/self-control. They found that the induction of 
positive affect significantly improved self-regulation, but only in a low-
mastery condition. In mastery conditions, self-control of subjects was not 
significantly affected by either induced negative or positive affect. 
Conversely, Ruderman (1985) found a complex interaction. He found that 
under the condition of an induced dysphoric mood, subjects who had been 
restrained earlier from eating over-indulged. Unrestrained subjects ate 
their normal amounts. 
Mischel and Staub (1965) some 20 years earlier found in studies of 
delay of gratification, that subjects who were given negative feedback on a 
task later preferred smaller, immediate rewards to larger delayed ones. 
Those who had received positive feedback tended to choose delayed, larger 
payoffs. Positive feedback was pinpointed as the critical component, since 
this study found that subjects who received no feedback at all responded 
the same as did those who had received negative feedback, that is, they 
wer~ unwilling to delay. 
In a highly pertinent study, Bennett (1974) concluded that high ~ 
esteem equalled success on parole, in other words, non-recidivism. Joplin 
(1972) had earlier found the same. Joplin, too, reports that high self-
esteem significantly predicted non-recidivists. 
Also possibly relevant to this self-affect factor was Messer (1976), 
who found that children who failed a grade in school remained at the same 
level of impulsiveness two and one half years later while the rest of the 
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children in the study demonstrated regular patterns of diminished 
impulsiveness. 
Perry (1985) appears to have produced a landmark study in finding that 
happy children exercised self-restraint significantly more than did unhappy 
children. Similarly, Fry (1975) found that children were more likely to 
break rules when recently given negative feedback regarding their failures 
or their personal shortcomings. That this particular factor is consistently 
influential over the lifespan is indicated by Graf (1971) in finding that 
undergraduate subjects responded exactly the same way. 
Goldstein, Rollins and Miller (1986) found distractability was 
positively related to reflection-impulsiveness. Highly distractable 
children were impulsive in their cognitive problem-solving style. They 
also found that a measure of persistence had a negative correlation with 
KFFT errors (a measure of impulsiveness). These data support Oas' (1985) 
findings of a positive attention deficit disorder-impulsiveness 
relationship. 
Kischel and Ketzner (1962), who found that age and intelligence were 
factors in children's ability to delay gratification, also found that the 
length of the delay involved was critical to this interaction. Walls and 
Smith (1970) later found a significant difference in the ability to delay 
gratification (defined as delayed reinforcement) between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children. They found that disadvantaged children would not 
defer small, immediate reinforcers for later, larger rewards while 
advantaged children would. 
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Certainly related to this current investigation of impulsiveness were 
the findings of Tarbox, Weigel and Biggs (1985). They found that a certain 
cognitive style (broad internal scanning) in alcoholics correlated with 
success in abstinence, one manifestation of self-control or a form of delay 
of gratification. 
Two studies found deep muscle relaxatipn to be associated with 
decreased impulsiveness. Gaber, Arieli and Merbaum (1984), and Porter and 
Omizo (1984) found significant reductions in impulsiveness covarying with 
increased relaxation practice. 
Birth prder was found by Lopez (1983) to be a significant variable to 
reflection-impulsivity. He found firstborns to be significantly more 
reflective and other birth-order subjects to be more impulsive. 
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Hypotheses 
Based on the foregoing review, several hypotheses were derived for 
testing. Hypothesis Number One is that risk-taking and impulsiveness are 
related concepts, but not the same. It is believed that risk-taking 
definitions incorporate the qualities defining impulsiveness. This would 
make impulsiveness a component of risk-taking. If this were the case, 
instrument intercorrelations between measures primarily measuring risk-
taking and those primarily measuring impulsiveness should result in strong 
but not total agreement. Since several of the measures are classed as 
assessors of risk-taking and others as assessors of impulsiveness, an 
analysis of which subjects score high and Iowan which measures should 
shed light on both of the qualities. Also indicated should be the 
suitability of each for research on offenders and the meaning of findings 
from those populations. 
Hypothesis Number Two is that prisoners will be found to be higher in 
impulsiveness and risky behaviors than the nonprisoner population. A test 
of this hypothesis will be made by performing ANOVAs on the means of the 
three groups on each measure. This, by the way, should tend to explicate 
results from the test of Hypothesis Number One. For example, if all 
instruments were assessing the same thing, then all should either 
differentiate or fail to differentiate the three incarceration-status groups. 
In other words, if the measures tap the same area, they will produce 
equivalent results in differentiating the groups. If prisoners are found to 
be higher in impulsiveness than nonprisoners, and if this finding is 
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supported by causal inferences, then interventions may be made for the 
purposes of crime prevention and criminal rehabilitation. 
Hypothesis Number Three is that impulsiveness and risk-taking will 
describe criminality better than age. One major potential of a supportive 
outcome would be the possibility of more accurate prediction. To test this 
hypothesis, correlations will be computed for age and all impulsiveness and 
risk measures. Secondly, ANOVA will be performed to determine age 
differences between the three groups. Thirdly, correlations between 
incarceration status and each impulsiveness measure will be computed. 
Hypothesis Number Four is that there are racial differences in the 
results of all measures used. This outcome is potentially important for 
more accurate application of interventions. Cause of these differences is a 
moot question insofar as their value for prediction of crime and 
rehabilitation of offenders. If either of the racial groups is found to 
have significantly higher impulsiveness, then interventions may be 
efficiently administered by tailoring to need, and effectively applied by 
giving sufficiently to th~ group in greatest need, rather than interpreting 
the figures at an over-all, racially mixed group norm. 
Hypothesis Number Five is that dissimulation will be higher in the 
prisoner groups, and that the dissimulation will significantly affect the 
results of all measures. If this should be found to be true, empirical 
support for the nongeneralizability of findings of the compared groups 
would be available, hopefully avoiding confusion and disappointment by 
researchers and rehabilitators alike. 
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Method 
Subjects 
Subjects for this study were volunteers recruited from four very 
different environments. Included were prisoners, an Army unit, a group of 
recovering alcoholics, and students from the technical school of a junior 
COllege. Since one of the main objectives was to compare prisoners with 
non-prisoners, subject groups were sought that would closely match 
prisoners on age, racial mix, education and social status. 
Prisoners were recruited from two locations. The first two groups were 
sentenced males and females incarcerated in a county work-release facility. 
The second two groups of prisoners were all males, both sentenced and 
unsentenced, from the county jail. 
The Army unit was an active-duty unit whose job is maintenance and 
repair of computerized weapons systems. 
The recovering alcoholics came from a group composed of persons 
attending a regular meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
The students were also from two different groups in regular attendance 
of classes at the vocational-technical division of a junior college. The 
first group tested was the morning refrigeration and air-conditioning 
class. The second group was from evening classes composed of students in 
the carpentry, electricity, and refrigeration and air-conditioning courses. 
There were a total of 212 subjects tested ranging in age from 18 to 45. 
Mean age was 27.14 years and the standard deviation was 6.6. After 
adjustments for infrequent responses were made 186 subjects remained in the 
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study. Males numbered 164 and females 22. Racially, the adjusted group 
contained 48 black, 136 white, and two "other" subjects. 
Data from seven subjects were discarded for the following reasons: 
There were three apparently illiterate responders, all of whom were 
prisoners; two were discarded for inappropriate responses, again these were 
from the prisoner population; two subjects completed the questionnaire 
properly but failed to enter their age or race, making their data useless. 
One of these last-mentioned was a female from the "erstwhile" population, a 
group of persons who have been incarcerated in the past but who are 
currently free, and the other came from a prisoner. 
After an initial set of correlations were computed for analysis and 
comparison, there were 19 subjects whose data was discarded because of 
elevated Infrequency scale (from the Jackson Personality Inventory). The 
level of acceptability chosen for this project allowed up to three of the 20 
possible infrequent responses to be made. It was arbitrarily determined 
that when a subject scored four or more on this scale of fairly obvious 
unusual statements, the rest of the data could not be relied upon and all 
data from that subject was discarded. An example item from the Infrequency 
scale is: "I have sight in only one eye." Subjects whose data were 
discarded were as follows, by incarceration-status groups: Black male 
prisoners, 8; ~hite male prisoners, 4; Black male never-arrested, 3; ~hite 
male "erstwhiles," 2; "other" race, male, 1. (While data from females is not 
considered in this report, it was of interest that no female subject of any 
class or race gave more than three Infrequent responses.) 
- 45 -
Also removed from this study were data from females because there were 
not enough of them in each incarceration-status group to compare 
meaningfully and also because of the extreme differences found between 
their mean scores and the males I • 
After removing females, subjects were 117 white males, mean age 26.29 
with a standard deviation of 6.37, and 45 black males, mean age 26.31 with 
a standard deviation of 6.39. These data were analyzed by race, then were 
regrouped into an unseparated racial mix before being redivided, this time 
by incarceration-status groups. Subjects were divided into three groups as 
follows: Males never arrested (n=53), mean age of 26.40, standard deviation 
of 5.63; males "erstwhile" (n=28), mean age of 27.32, standard deviation of 
6.76; male prisoners (n=83), mean age of 26.29, standard deviation of 6.67. 
Procedures 
Subject testing on the two work-release prisoner groups was done in 
the evening; on the prisoner groups in the jail, one was done in the 
morning and one in the evening. The Army group was tested in the late 
afternoon and the Alcoholics Anonymous groups were tested late at night. 
One of the two groups of students were tested in the early morning and the 
other in the evening. 
Data were collected from subjects in large groups. Instructions were 
read prior to distributing questionnaires. A copy of the instructions which 
were read is included as Appendix I, and a copy of the two-page 
questionnaire is included as Appenxdix II. 
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All subjects in the prisoner population in both incarceration facilities 
were initially brought into a large room for my introduction and request 
for volunteers. Subjects in the other populations were approached as they 
regularly met to request their participation. Of the prisoners at the work 
release facility only about 25% of the total inmate population participated. 
Of the prisoners at the jail, about 75% participated. A little over half of 
the men assigned to the same job area in the U.S. Army unit agreed to 
participate. About 25% of the persons attending the A.A. meeting agreed to 
stay late to participate. About 80% of the students who were requested to 
participate did so. 
Once those who did not wish to participate had left the area, the 
instructions were read, questions were answered, and materials passed out. 
The only exception to this was the prisoner groups. In two cases, at the 
work release center where volunteers had to leave the area and go to 
another building, and at the jail where the procedures allow men to leave 
who did not wish to participate, administration of the timed section was 
impossible. As a result only a few subject~ completed the timed portion of 
the questionnaire and those results will not be included in this project. 
Analyses 
The analyses consisted of performing simple one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVA)computations to compare the three groups: never-arrested, 
erstwhile, prisoner. The ANOVAs tested the null hypothesis that the groups 
were equal in age and in levels of self-control (Sc, CPI), volunteering 
behavior, impulsiveness (Eysenck 17), risk-taking (Rt, JPI) and cigarette 
smoking behavior. Computations and analyses of correlations were also 
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performed to obtain an indication of change in the measures with age and 
with incarceration status. Also investigated were instrument 
intercorrelations. 
Instruments; Description and Rationale 
A copy of the questionnaire, which is a compilation of same 11 separate 
measures, is included as Appendix II. As has been discussed, data from all 
of the sections was nat utilized. The separate tests were reduced to 75% 
their original typewritten size, then printed an bath sides of 14-inch 
paper. Simple written instructions prefaced each section. 
Volunteering Behayior Assessment. The first section explains the 
interest of the researcher in doing future work and in determining what 
percent of subjects could be expected to participate in the proposed 
projects. The respondent is asked to check either of the twa experiments 
if he would be willing to participate. 
The first future experiment to be described is a study of gambling 
behavior. The subject is informed he will have the opportunity to win and 
keep worthwhile rewards. He is further informed there is also the chance 
of receiving a mild electric shock during this experiment. The second 
choice the subject has is to participate in a study requiring extensive 
personality testing utilizing questionnaires. This section represents an 
attempt to asses~ risk-taking or impulsiveness behaviorally, as well as 
distinguish it from volunteerism. 
Self-Control/Impulsiveness Assessment. The next measure is the Self-
Control scale (Sc) from the California Psychological Inventory. It contains 
50 items and all are presented in the same order they appear in that larger 
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instrument. An example of the items is: "I find it hard to keep my mind 
on a task or job." Subjects register their responses by circling a T or F, 
for true and false. As mentioned earlier, Sc was originally designed to 
assess a quality labeled impulsiveness and was named the Impulsiveness 
Scale. Later, the direction of the items in this scale was reversed for 
consistency in form with the other scales of the CPl. The scale was 
renamed Self-Control, implying the polar construct of the concept assessed, 
from Impulsiveness to Self-control. Permission for inclusion of Sc from 
CPI was secured from the copyright holder. 
Demographic Data. The third section was for the purpose of obtaining 
the necessary demographic material on the subject: Sex. age, race, 
education, and arrest history. 
(Xodifjed) Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire. The next section was a 
modified form of the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ). Items were 
reworded based on difficulties experienced by a group of ex-prisoners 
during pretesting. They reported they could not understand the original 
CDQ questions, with topics such as "blue chip" stock purchase decisions. It 
is suspected the method of subjective assessment ("How sure would you have 
to be in order to advise your friend to take the risk?") was also confusing 
to most subjects, and not limited to the prisoner group. 
There are five items in this portion. Two items (Items number 3 and 
5) introduce choices associated with offending. Permission was obtained 
from Michael Wallach, one of the creators of the CDQ. to utilize the ideas 
and the modified items. An example of the items is: "On your job as a 
computer operator with a large firm you have discovered there is an account 
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where your company deposits customer refunds until they are claimed. You 
are able to transfer money from the refunds account to your own account for 
short periods of time in order to draw interest on it amounting to a very 
large sum of money over time. If you are caught you will lose your job and 
possibly have charges filed against you. On a scale of 0 to 100 per cent, 
how sure of success must you be to move the money?" 
The original CDQ was created to assess the risk-taking propensity of 
individuals and was used on subjects who were generally well educated. It 
presents a hypothetical situation wherein the subject must advise a third 
party in making making a choice. An example is the presentation of a 
situation where the subject is to advise a friend about quitting a secure 
job in order to go into business for himself. The subject is to mark how 
sure he would have to be of success of the risky venture in order to advise 
his friend to make the risky choice. The answer is made by circling a 
number representing percentages, ten of them in a Likert-type array, from 
10 to 100. A low number represents a riskier position and a high number 
represents more caution, a need for greater levels of certainty. 
While an assessment of risk-taking propensity or preference is required 
for investigating its relationship with impulsiveness, some research has 
shown that responses from the CDQ do not reflect the real-life risky 
behaviors of subjects. Herman (1984) investigated risks taken by patients 
in the management of a health problem and found a complex interaction of 
factors involved in behavior that was not reflected in hypothetical risky 
choice questions. Additionally Jenson, Erickson and Gibbs (1978) found 
that perceived risk involving another person was less predictive of actual 
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choice than was perceived personal risk. The CDQ-type form was 
nevertheless included because of its extensive use in previous studies and 
also because it offered a vehicle for incorporating the crime-related 
probes. 
Risky Behaviors Survey. Next is a section exploring actual risky 
behaviors and the attitudes associated with them. The areas explored are 
behaviors which have been about equally publicized as being dangerous. 
This made more likely attitudes about them would not be dependent on 
specialized knowledge. These measures were felt to represent the 
individual's actual choices concerning risky behaviors. Assessed were 
smoking behavior, weight, and use of seatbelts. The only responses used in 
this study are those concerning cigarette smoking behavior. The item asks 
how many cigarettes the subject smokes per day. 
Risk-taking Assessment and Infrequent Responses. The next section is 
comprised of the Risk-taking and Infrequency scales of the Jackson 
Personality Inventory (JPI). Each scale contains 20 items. Both scales are 
presented in the same order in which they appear in the larger instrument. 
They are alternated such that every other item is of the same scale. The 
odd-numbered items assess risk-taking while the even assess infrequency. 
An example of the Infrequency items has already been provided. An example 
of the Risk-taking scale items is: "People have told me I seem to enjoy 
taking chances." Answers are indicated by circling T or F, for true and 
false. Permission for use of these scales was obtained by permission from 
the copyright holder. 
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The Infrequency scale was chosen because the experimenter has heard 
prisoners comment that their test-taking is not always conscientious, often 
being done haphazardly, carelessly, or with the intent of producing a 
specific impression. The inclusion of this scale was first of all to 
analyze differences in group data before and after infrequent responders 
were eliminated. An infrequent responder was arbitrarily determined to be 
any subject with four or more infrequent responses. 
The Risk-taking scale is intended to assess the degree of risk-taking 
behavior. The high scorer is defined by the ,JPI manual thus: "Enjoys 
gambling and taking a chance; willingly exposes self to situations with 
uncertain outcomes; enjoys adventures having an element of peril; takes 
chances; unconcerned with danger." 
Impulsiveness and Venturespmeness <Eysenck 1-7). The next section, 
containing 54 items, is the longest of this survey. This instrument is the 
product of Sybil Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, and Allsopp (1985). The 
questionnaire (1-7) is composed of items assessing three qualities which 
they call impulsiveness, venturesomeness, and empathy. An example of an 
Impulsiveness scale item is: "Are you often surprised at people's reactions 
to what you do or say?" Items are answered by circling a yes or no 
response according to whether or not the statement made by the item fits 
the subject. Permission for use of 1-7 was obtained in writing from Sybil 
Eysenck. 
Other Sections 
Also incorporated into this questionnaire were inquiries about the 
subject's vocational preferences, a subjective evaluation of satisfaction 
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with certain areas of life, a superficial health assessment, and probes 
about how dangerous certain risky behaviors actually felt to be and subject 
fluency (intelligence). None of the data from these measures is included in 
the present report. 
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Results 
Hypothesis Number One stated that impulsiveness and risk-taking are 
separate but related concepts. Computed correlations between the 
instruments used in this study produced some significant relationships. As 
well, they produced some covariances which were surprisingly unimpressive. 
An example of significant findings from correlations between measures in 
the total group of all subjects (see Table 1) was the powerful finding 
(p <.0001) of a negative correlation between CPI Self-control and 1-7 
Impulsiveness (r=-.59). On the other hand, there was no significant 
correlation between Self-control and 1-7 Venturesomeness. This indicates 
that CPI Self-control (which was conceived of, remember, by its creator as 
a reciprocal of impulsiveness) and 1-7 Impulsiveness are measuring a 
similar quality, while 1-7 Venturesomeness is assessing a quality only 
weakly related to either, if at all. 
This distinction between the qualities is relevant because of the 
logical association between them. It seems that Risk-taking and 
Venturesomeness may well be quite healthy traits, perhaps indicators of 
self-actualization. Impulsiveness, on the other hand, appears to have no 
positive connotations and, as measured by 1-7, significantly discriminates 
prisoners-criminals from nonprisoners-noncriminals (r= .33, p < .0001), and 
ANOVA significantly discriminates between prisoners and nonprisoners 
(p <'0003). 
Surprisingly, given the correlational data indicating the contrary, 
ANOVA found that Venturesomeness also discriminated the groups, and it did 
so at a p <'01 significance level. Curiously, however. it was the erstwhile 
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Notes for Reading Tables 
CPI: This is the Self-control/impulsiveness scale of the CPl. 
CDQ: This is the modified Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire. 
VLG: This is the behavior of volunteering for the gambling experiment. 
IMP: This is the Impulsiveness scale of the 1-7. 
VEN: This is the Venturesomeness scale of the 1-7. 
RTK; This is the Risk-taking scale of the JPI. 
CIG: This is cigarette-smoking behavior measured in number of 
cigarettes smoked daily. 
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cpr 
CDQ 
VOL 
IMP 
VEN 
Table 1 
Instrument Intercorrelations Using Data From All Subjects 
C£.L 
1.0000 
.0000 
200 
.1682 -.1560 -.5836 
.0237* .0274' .0001" 
181 200 188 
1.0000 -.0060 -.2351 
.0000 .9349 .0017** 
186 186 176 
1.0000 
.0000 
205 
.0012 
.9871 
193 
1.0000 
.0000 
193 
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-.1274 -.2802 -.2014 
.0814 
188 
.0093 
.9021 
176 
.1258 
.0814 
193 
-.0337 
.6422 
193 
1.0000 
.0000 
193 
.0001" . 0057" 
192 187 
-.1546 .0627 
.0366" . 4030 
183 180 
.0558 
.4370 
.1067 
.1418 
196 191 
.2783 .2360 
.0001" . 0013" 
188 182 
.0587 .0410 
.0046** .5826 
188 182 
RTK 
CIG 
• p <.05. 
Hp<.Ol. 
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1.0000 
.0000 
196 
.1272 
.0812 
189 
1.0000 
.0000 
189 
group who were significantly higher in Venturesomeness than either the 
prisoner or the never-arrested group. 
Impulsiveness, as indicated by an inverse of CPI Self-control, 
significantly discriminated the three incarceration-status groups 
through correlational computations of r=-.32 (p <.0001). ANOVA resulted 
in significant differences between the groups (p <.0003). Significant 
correlations between CPI Self-control at p <.03 level were, positively, 
the CDQ and, negatively, volunteering behavior. Other significant 
negative correlations with cpr Sc reached significance at a p <.01 
level. These were the Impulsiveness scale from 1-7, the Risk-taking 
scale from JPI and cigarette smoking behavior. 
The CDQ instrument failed to significantly correlate with 
volunteering and cigarette smoking behaviors, and the 1-7 
Venturesomeness scale. 
1-7 Impulsiveness failed to correlate with Venturesomeness, just as 
it was reported to do by its creators. It did, however, significantly 
correlate with cigarette smoking behavior and Risk-taking, as well as 
Self-control. 
Volunteering (for future research) behavior significantly correlated 
with Incarceration status, but with no other measures. This outcome 
could be an indication of boredom in jail and a readiness to relieve it, 
or a desire to make a good impression in order to boosting personal 
self-esteem or to secure imagined future benefits. On the other hand, 
specific volunteerism for the gambling experiment which included the 
possibility of painful shocks did correlate significantly with JPI Risk-
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taking (r=.23, p <.004) as well as with amount of arrests (r=.16, p 
<.04). Moreover, volunteering for gambling with chance of painful 
shocks correlated negatively with Self-control (r=-.17, p <.03). 
The subpopulations of this study (male and female, White and Black, 
prisoner-erstwhile-never arrested) were found to differ significantly 
from each other on most measures; however, the instruments of measure 
maintained roughly the same interrelationships. As an example, Table 2 
presents roughly the same instrument intercorrelations as in Table 1, 
but the data were derived from white males, one subgroup of the study's 
subjects. 
Hypothesis Humber Two stated that prisoners would be higher in 
impulsiveness and risk-taking than never-arrested subjects. A series of 
ANOVAs were performed, seeking to determine whether differences between 
prisoners and the other groups were significant. The dependent variable 
in these analyses was incarceration status (three groups of never-
arrested, erstwhile, and prisoners). The independent variable was the 
mean score and variance of each group on each measure. These were: CPI 
~Sc), CDQ-type questionnaire, 1-7 Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness 
scales, JPI Risk-taking and Infrequency scales, and the behavioral 
measures of volunteering and Cigarette smoking. Table 3 lists the means 
by group and their standard deviations. Asterisks indicate those 
measures or instruments significantly differentiating the three groups. 
A pretest was the ANOVA computation performed to ascertain any age 
differences between the three groups. There was no significant 
difference. (F=.31, df=2, P <.73) 
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A pretest was the ANOVA computation performed to ascertain any age 
differences between the three groups. There was no significant 
difference. (F=.31, df=2, P <.73) 
Table 2 
CPI 
ell 
1.0000 
Instrument Intercorrelations 
in the Population of White Males 
.2822 -.1250 -.5997 -.0887 -.2877 -.2570 
.0000 .0027" .1689 .000111 .0048" .0015" .0046" 
121 111 121 117 117 119 120 
CDQ 1.0000 -.0126 -.3338 .0144 -.2366 -.1035 
VOL 
IMP 
.0000 
114 
.8944 
114 
1.0000 
. 0000 
124 
.0004" 
110 
-.0012 
.9899 
120 
.8809 
110 
.0755 
.4123 
120 
1.0000 -.0578 
.0000 
120 
- 59 -
.5304 
120 
· 0116' 
113 
· 0510 
.5773 
122 
.3142 
.2731 
114 
.1786 
.04811 
123 
.2545 
· 0005.. . 0052" 
119 119 
VEN 
RTK 
eIG 
• P <.05 . 
.. P <.01. 
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1.0000 
.0000 
120 
.1737 
.0589 
119 
1.0000 
.0000 
122 
.0451 
.6260 
119 
.1277 
.1611 
122 
1.0000 
.0000 
123 
Table 3 
Incarceration-Status Group Means and Standard Deviations 
All Males Less High Infrequency Scorers 
Never-Arrested Erstwhile Prisoners 
M.ean. St. Dey. ill.L Mean. St. Dev. ill.L He..a.n. St. Dey. 
nCPI 26.18 6.55 (51) 23.29 7.91 (28) 20.58 7.55 
CDQ 405.5 66.8 (47 ) 400.8 55.2 (26) 385.8 78.0 
HVOL .47 .61 (53) .54 .51 (28) .81 .59 
VLG .1509 .36 (53) .1786 .39 (28) .2410 .43 
HIMP 7.04 4.16 (50) 8.39 4.34 (28) 10.45 4.49 
*VEN 8.36 2.88 (50) 10.14 2.95 (28) 7.54 3.38 
RTK 7.40 3.57 (50) 8.50 4.52 (28) 8.15 3.83 
*INF(VI).4286 .495 (42) .7917 .892 
"CIG 7.25 10.41 (51) 13.71 12.94 (28) 17.35 12.31 
* P <.05. 
Hp<.Ol. 
(VI) Vlhites only. 
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ill.L 
(80) 
(74) 
(74) 
(83) 
(76) 
(76) 
(78) 
(48) 
(75) 
1) The CPI Self-control scale (Sc) significantly differentiated the 
three incarceration-status groups. The results of ANOVA on the means of 
the three groups revealed significant difference (F=8.79, df=2, 
P <.0003). The group differences were analyzed through Fisher's Least 
Significant Differences (LSD) test and it was found that the never-
arrested group was significantly higher in self-control than the 
erstwhile group (26.1765-23.2857=2.8908). who were. in turn, 
significantly higher in self-control than were the prisoners tested 
(23.2857-20.5750=2.7107). Fisher's LSD with t at the .005 level was 
2.5305. 
2) In contrast, the second test of the power of the CDQ-type 
instrument to differentiate failed to achieve significance. The results 
of ANOVA on the means of the three groups revealed that the CDQ-type 
instrument does not differentiate the three groups (F=.99. df=2. 
p=n. s. ). 
3) The third test was of the power of the behavioral measure of 
volunteering responses to differentiate the three groups. The results 
of ANOVA on the means of the three groups revealed that volunteering 
behavior significantly differentiates the three groups (F=10.19, df=2, 
P <.0001). Results of Fisher's LSD computations show prisoners (mean 
volunteering score=.8072) were significantly higher in volunteering 
behavior than erstwhiles (mean=.5357) and never-arresteds (mean=.4717). 
While higher, erstwhiles' mean score did not achieve significance over 
never-arresteds' even using t at the .05 level. 
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4) The fourth test was of the power of the volunteering for the 
gambling experiment carrying a possibility of painful shock to 
differentiate the three groups. This response failed to differentiate 
(F=.24, df=2, p=n.s.). 
5) The fifth test was of the power of the Infrequency scale of the 
JPI to differentiate the three groups. The results of ANOVA revealed no 
significant difference between the three groups (F=1.23, df=2, p=n.s.). 
However, a t-test between the never-arrested group mean and the prisoner 
group mean (data available for Whites only) showed a significant 
difference (t=2.04, p <.025). 
6) The sixth test was of the power of the Impulsiveness scale of 
the Eysenck 1-7 to differentiate the three groups. The results of AHOVA 
on the means of the three groups revealed that the Impulsiveness scale 
significantly differentiates them (F=8.54, df=2, P <.0003). The result 
of the Fisher's LSD computation was that the prisoner group mean (10.45) 
was significantly higher than the erstwhile group mean (8.39) and the 
prisoner group mean (7.04) with t at the .005 level (LSD=1.475). The 
erstwhile group mean was found to be significantly higher than the 
never-arrested group when t was at the .01 level (LSD= 1.332). 
7) The seventh test was of the power of the Venturesomeness scale 
of the Eysenck 1-7 to differentiate the three groups. The results of 
ANOVA on the means of the three groups revealed that the Venturesomeness 
scale of the Eysenck 1-7 differentiated them (F=4.39, df=2, P <.02). 
This time it was the Erstwhile group that had the significantly higher 
score. The erstwhile group mean was 10.14; the never-arrested group 
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mean was 8.36: the prisoner group mean was 7.54, and Fisher's LSD was 
.9529 when twas at the .005 level. 
8) The eighth test was of the power of the Risk-taking scale of the 
JPI to differentiate the three groups. The results of AIOVA on the 
means of the three groups revealed that risk-taking, as measured by the 
JPI, failed to differentiate the three groups (F=1.03, df=2, P <.36). 
9) The ninth test was of the power of amount of cigarettes smoked 
daily as a measure of a risky behavior (cigarette smoking) to 
differentiate the three groups. The results of ANOVA on the means of 
the three groups revealed that cigarette smoking significantly 
differentiated the three groups <F=9.36, p <.0002). The range in number 
of cigarettes smoked daily reported by the three groups were as follows: 
never arrested, 0-30 cigarettes daily; erstwhile, 0-40 cigarettes daily; 
and prisoner, 0-60 cigarettes daily. Fisher's LSD (with t at the .005 
level, LSD=4.094) shows that erstwhiles smoked significantly more than 
never-arresteds and with t at .025 <Fisher's LSD=3.115), the prisoners 
smoked significantly more than did the erstwhiles. 
Summarizing, the measures found to significantly differentiate the 
three incarceration-status groups were the following: Self-control, a 
reciprocal of impulsiveness as measured by the CPI; volunteering 
behavior; Impulsiveness as measured by the 1-7; Venturesomeness also as 
measured by the 1-7; Infrequency, the JPI measure of infrequent 
responses; and cigarette smoking as measured by amount of cigarettes 
smoked daily. Prisoners scored lower on self-control, and higher on 
impulSiveness than the other groups on all the measures of those 
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qualities. They scored significantly high~r on risky behaviors 
(volunteering and smoking) than did the other two groups. The exception 
was found in a measure which was actually not a measure of 
impulsiveness. It was the 1-7 Venturesomeness scale. The erstwhile 
group scored the highest on that measure. There were no significant 
differences between the three groups in qualities measured by the CDQ 
and the JPI Risk-taking scale. The JPI Infrequency scale was a 
differentiating factor between prisoners and never-arresteds only in the 
case of White males. 
• • • 
Hypothesis Number Three was that impulsiveness and risk-taking would 
both describe and predict criminality better than age does. In order to 
test this, first the correlations between age and scores from each 
measure were analyzed. Next, correlations between incarceration status 
and each measure were examined. Incarceration status consisted of three 
levels, which made more difficult the interpretation of correlational 
data; age was grouped into' eight levels, which likewise was a bit more 
than usual for performing ~nalysis of variance. Nevertheless, no 
indication that age has anything to do with incarceration is apparent in 
correlational data. Analysis of variance on the mean ages of the three 
groups disclosed that there is no significant difference between them. 
Furthermore, correlational data shows age seems to have very little to 
do with risk and impulsiveness. If impulsiveness explains crime better 
than age, then prisoners would be expected to exhibit significantly 
higher impulsiveness, and probably risk-taking tendencies, than the 
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other two groups, regardless of their age. The hypothesis was supported 
by results of ANOVA performed in testing Hypothesis Number Two. 
Table 4 lists the relevant results of correlations of each measure 
and age. Table 5 presents the correlations between each measure and 
each incarceration group. Table 6 presents correlations between age and 
measure, by incarceration group. Table 7 shows the mean ages of the 
three groups, as well as the mean age by race. 
Age was divided into eight levels, 18-20; 21-23; 24-26; 27-29; 30-
32; 33-35; 36-38; 39+. ANOVA was performed on the three incarceration 
groups by these age groups and no significant differences were found 
(F=.23, df=2, p=n.s.). There also were no age differences between 
racial groups (see Table 7). 
Table 8 presents correlational data from the erstwhile group 
indicating that impulsiveness varies with the amount of time elapsed 
since last release from jail. This additional data strengthens a causal 
inference that impulsiveness is a source of criminal behavior. While 
none of these impulsiveness-time elapsed correlations reach significance 
they are sufficiently directional to suggest a relationship which might 
be found through more accurate operationalization. This relationship is 
the one existing between the passage of time <probably not age alone) 
since last arrest and diminished impulsiveness. The passage of time 
alone (age), it is to be remembered, occurs in a significant 
relationship with diminished impulsiveness only in the group which has 
managed to stay out of jail in some way, the never-arresteds. 
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AGE 
IE. 
(r) -.0130 
(p) .8691 
(n) 164 
* p <.10. 
** P <. 05. 
Table 4 
Correlatipns pf Each Measure and Age 
All Males 
CD.Q. 
.0831 
.3200 
147 
J:.ll 
-.0006 
.9900 
156 
.0135 -.0682 -.1326 -.1121 
.8663 .3854 .101H .1663 
159 164 154 154 
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. 1808 
.0249** 
154 
Table 5 
Cprrelations of Each Measure and Incarceration Status 
IE. 
INC (r) -.0130 
<p) .8691 
(n) 164 
• p <.10 . 
•• P <. 01. 
GOO 
-.3249 
. 0001" 
159 
All Males 
.2552 
. 0010 .. 
164 
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.3334 -.1351 
.0001.. .0947. 
154 154 
Clii. 
.3548 
.000lt • 
154 
Table 6 
Correlations of Age and Keasures. By Group 
Never-Arrested 
CPI-AGE (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
VOL-AGE (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
IMP-AGE (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
VEN-AGE (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
CIG-AGE (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
• p < .05. 
.. P < .01. 
.0631 
.6601 
51 
-.0051 
.9711 
53 
-.3247 
.0214* 
50 
-.2120 
.1394 
50 
.3786 
.0062** 
51 
Erstwhile 
- 69 -
-.0075 
.9705 
28 
-.2138 
.2746 
28 
-.0764 
.6992 
28 
.0737 
.7094 
28 
.0472 
.8113 
28 
Prisoner 
.0083 
.9437 
80 
-.0535 
.6312 
83 
-.0689 
.5541 
76 
-.1631 
.1591 
76 
.1810 
.1206 
75 
Table 7 
Mean Age, Standard Deviation, and Range by Group 
And Mean Age, Standard Deviation, and Range by Race--Prisoners Only 
Neyer-Arrested 
~ St. Dey, ~ 
26.39 5.63 19-43 
White Males 
Erstwhile 
~ St. Dey. Range 
27.32 6.76 18-45 
Prisoners 
~ St. Dey, Ranga 
26.59 6.5~ 18-45 
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Prisqners 
~ St. Dey. ~ 
26.28 6.67 18-44 
Black Males 
Mean St. Dey. Ranga 
27.57 6.17 18-42 
Table 8 
Correlations Between Time Since Release 
In the Erstwhile Group and Each Keasure 
Time Since Release-CPI(Sc) 
Time Since Release-VOL 
Time Since Release-IMP 
Time Since Release-CIG 
(r) .1946 
(p) .3407 
(n) 26 
(r) -.2086 
(p) .3064 
(n) 26 
(r) -.2493 
(p) .2194 
(n) 26 
(r) -.0901 
(p) .6615 
(n) 26 
(Note: While none of these correlations reached significance, their 
direction of correlation is, nevertheless, supportive of the contentions 
of this paper.) 
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Adding further strength to inferences of causality are the 
correlations relating impulsiveness to total amount of arrests in both 
the prisoner group and the erstwhiles. Those correlations are listed in 
Table 9. 
• • • 
Hypothesis Number Four was that there are significant differences 
between racial groups in their scores on impulsiveness and risk-taking 
measures, especially in the prisoner subjects. Table 7 lists means and 
standard deviations for prisoners of both races on each instrument. 
Simple t-tests were computed comparing racial groups for the prisoner 
subpopulation only and prisoners were found to significantly differ on 
CPI Self-control, and on 1-7 Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness <listed 
in Table 10). 
a) Results of the simple one-way t-test comparison of Black and 
White prisoners' CPI Self-control group means were: t=1.36, .10 <p 
<.05, around .07. The Black prisoners reflected significantly higher 
self-control scores. 
b) The results of a simple one-way t-test comparison of Black and 
White prisoners' group means from the Eysenck 1-7 Impulsiveness scale 
were: t=1.70, p <.05. Black prisoners reflected significantly lower 
Impulsiveness scores than did White prisoners. 
c) The results of a simple one-way t-test comparison of Black and 
White prisoners' group means on the Eysenck 1-7 were: t=2.95, p <.01. 
Black prisoners reflected significantly lower Venturesomeness scores 
than did White prisoners. 
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Table 9 
Relationship of Impulsiveness Measures to 
Number of Admitted Arrests 
Erstwhiles 
AMT-REL (r) -.3790 
(p) .0562* 
(n) 26 
AMT-CPI (r) -.2582 
(p) 
(n) 
AMT-CDQ (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
.1846 
28 
.3681 
.0643-
26 
AMT-VOL (r) -.1204 
(p) .5415 
(n) 28 
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Prisoners 
.0000 
1.0000 
83 
-.0664 
.5583 
80 
-.1132 
.3362 
74 
.1342 
.2269 
83 
AMT- IMP (r) 
(p) 
(n) 
.3052 
. 1143 (Hear significance) 
28 
AMT-GIG (r) .2467 
<p) .2057 
(n) 28 
AMT symbolizes Number of Arrests. 
REL symbolizes time elapsed since release. 
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. 1046 
.3687 
76 
.0965 
.4100 
75 
Table 10 
Comparisons of Measures By Race 
1i1li.t..e. Pd soners Black Prisoners 
krul. St. Dev. .ill2.. Mean. St. Dey . .ill2.. 
fePI 19.58 7.95 (48) 22.95 6.82 (40) 
eDQ 392.2 76.2 (45) 377.5 80.7 (36) 
VOL .96 .45 (49) .57 .70 (42) 
GAl( .25 .43 (49) .21 .42 (42) 
*IMP 10.98 4.82 (47) 9.32 3.59 (37) 
-VEN 8.28 3.16 (47) 6.32 3.15 (37) 
RTK 8.52 4.24 (48) 7.79 3.16 (37) 
INF .79 .94 (48) 2.21 2.20 (38) 
eIG 19.40 13.33 (48) 14.55 10.73 (33) 
f Significant difference, p <.05. 
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Age. 
Age 1.0000 
.0000 
53 
CPI .0631 1.0000 
.6601 
51 
.0000 
51 
CDQ .0419 -.0272 
.7799 .8593 
47 45 
VLG -.2473 -.2693 
Table 11. 1 
Intercorrelations by Group 
Never-Arrested Group <n=53) 
.2453 
.0742* .0560* .0966* 
53 51 47 
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IMP -.3247 -.4353 
.0214** .0020t 
50 48 
-.2408 
.1111 
45 
.1945 
.1760 
50 
VEN -.2120 -.1005 .2316 .2705 .0712 
.1394 .4968 .1259 .05751 .6234 
50 48 45 50 50 
RTK -.0603 -.2937 -.0253 .1665 .4477 .1718 
.6774 .0427** .8672 .2478 .0013t .2378 
49 50 48 46 50 49 
INF .0588 -.0434 -.2914 -.1315 
.6850 .6795 .0495** .3640 
51 49 47 51 
.2425 -.0979 
. 0932* . 5033 
49 40 
.0469 
.7463 
50 
eIG .3786 -.0239 -.0602 .0626 .0851 .1818 .1539 .2482 
.0062t .8704 .6877 
51 49 47 
* p <.10 
** P <.05 
t P <.01 
.6626 .5610 .2112 .2859 .0823* 
51 49 49 50 50 
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~ 
Age 1.0000 
.0000 
28 
CPI -.0073 
.9705 
28 
1.0000 
.0000 
28 
Table 11. 2 
Intercorrelations by Group 
Erstwhile Group (n=28) 
CDQ .0728 
.7238 
26 
.1483 1.0000 
.4698 .0000 
26 
VLG -.0647 -.0292 
.7436 .8829 
28 28 
28 
.0472 1. 0000 
.8191 .0000 
28 28 
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IMP -.0764 
.6992 
28 
-.6272 
.0004t 
28 
-.4583 .1977 
.0185** .3133 
26 28 
VEN .0737 .0902 .2359 .2986 -.3195 
.7094 
28 
.6481 
26 
.2458 
28 
.1227 
28 
.0974* 
28 
RTK .1231 -.1452 .1601 .7463 .0727 .3804 
.5326 
28 
.4611 
26 
.4348 .0001t 
28 28 
.7131 
28 
.0458** 
28 
INF -.1657 .0031 -.0455 -.0432 -.0540 -.0395 -.0713 
.3993 .9875 .8254 .8271 
28 28 26 28 
.7848 
28 
.9420 
28 
.7186 
28 
eIG .0472 -.1118 .1754 .4599 -.0091 .3966 .3954 
.8113 
28 
* p <.10 
** P <.05 
t P <. 01 
.5712 
28 
.3916 
26 
.0160** .0932- . 0306** . 0373** 
28 28 28 28 
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Table 11. 3 
Intercorrelations by Group 
Prisoner Group (=83) 
Age 
Age 1.0000 
.0000 
83 
CPI 
CPI .0080 1.0000 
.9437 .0000 
80 80 
CDQ 
CDQ .0985 .2542 1.0000 
.4037 .0324.' .0000 
74 71 74 
VLG IMP 
VLG .0901 -.1367 -.0709 1.0000 
.4178 .2268 
83 80 
.5478 
74 
.0000 
83 
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VEN RTK CIG 
IMP -.0689 -.5592 -.2199 -.1204 1.0000 
.5541 
76 
.0001t .07161 .3004 .0000 
73 68 76 76 
VEN -.1631 
. 1591 
76 
-.2677 -.0778 
.0221" .5282 
73 68 
.0197 
.8659 
76 
.1582 1.0000 
.1723 .0000 
76 76 
RTK -.0247 -.4277 -.2195 -.0612 .4179 .4134 1.0000 
.8299 
78 
.0001t .06401 .5947 
76 72 78 
.0002t 
73 
.0003t .0000 
73 78 
INF .2509 .0249 -.1583 -.1367 .1744 -.2450 .0204 
.0267** .8310 
78 76 
. 1841 
72 
.2328 
78 
.1401 
73 
.0367** .8596 
73 78 
eIG .1810 -.2265 .0086 -.1552 .2717 .0827 .0494 
. 1201 
75 
* P <.10 
** P <.05 
t P <. 01 
.0540* .9437 
73 70 
.1836 
75 
.0229* .4960 
75 70 
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.6763 
74 
.0502 
.6711 
74 
Discussion 
One finding of this study is that impulsiveness and risky behaviors 
are found to occur at significantly higher levels in criminals <prisoners) 
than in noncriminals <nonprisoners), both excriminals and those who have 
never offended. This was established through ANOVA and supported by a 
positive correlation between impulsiveness and incarceration status (r=.24, 
p <.001). These correlational results indicate that as incarceration status 
increases in severity, so does impulsiveness increase. 
Another important set of findings, and a surprise, is that risk-taking 
and venturesomeness occur at significantly higher levels in the "erstwhile" 
group <excriminals) than in criminals, and was lowest in the never-
arrested group. This finding supports the idea of a developmental change 
in impulsiveness occurring in the offender which, when it is accomplished, 
equates with desisting from crime. A related, or possibly reciprocal, 
finding is that self-control occurs at significantly lower levels in 
criminals than in noncriminals. Self-control occurs at a significantly 
higher rate in exoffenders than in offenders, and further is significantly 
higher in those who have never offended than in exoffenders. Additionally 
and again surprisingly, risk-taking measures did not differentiate 
criminals from noncriminals. 
It is believed, however, that the most important findings of this study 
were the result of comparisons made in order to support these original 
points. The first of these is that impulsiveness does, indeed, decline with 
age (r=- .32, P < .02), as would be logically expected, but only in the case of 
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the "normal" Dr never-arrested population. This age-related decrement was 
not found to occur in criminals, whether they were currently incarcerated 
or had been free for varying lengths of time. Another of these supportive 
points which turn out to be important was the finding that impulsiveness 
was strongly correlated with amount of arrests of an individual (r=.26, 
p < .0004). This category equates with classifications labeled as "past 
history of offending." Still another of these support-type findings was 
that impulsiveness diminished as length of time since last arrest or 
release increased (r=- .22, P < .02) . In other words, as subjects managed to 
remain out of jail longer and longer, their impulsiveness was found to be 
proportionately less. 
In searching for a factor which would predict and describe criminal 
behavior better than age, risky behaviors were utilized as samples of 
generalized risky or impulsive behavior in the individual. Volunteering 
behavior, specifically for the gambling experiment which was potentially 
either rewarding or punishing and labeled a risky behavior, was found to 
decrease with age (r=-.25, p <.07) in the never-arrested group. This 
finding supported the results of ANOVA in levels of impulsiveness between 
the three groups of this study. Nevertheless, in both the erstwhile and 
prisoner groups there was no significant relationship between this measure 
of impulsiveness and age (r=-.07, p <.70 for the erstwhiles; r=-.07, p <.55 
for prisoners), These volunteering behavior data support the impulsiveness 
data. 
The outcomes reflecting measures of impulsiveness, volunteering for a 
risky experiment and cigarette smoking were also found to significantly 
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differentiate the three incarceration-status groups. Prisoners had 
significantly higher risky behavior and impulsiveness scores with the 
erstwhile group scores falling consistently in between the prisoner and the 
never-arrested groups. 
Self-control, as measured by the CPI, highly correlated with 
impulsiveness as measured by 1-7, (r=-.58, p <.0001), made no reciprocal 
increases with age in any of the groups. This finding seems to contradict 
the suggestion that self-control as measured by the CPI is the reciprocal 
concept of impulsiveness, at least insofar as impulsiveness is measured by 
the 1-7. One interesting possiblity is that self-control is a foundational 
quality, and from its presence or absence arises impulsiveness. This 
quality could be stable by age 18 and, since the lowest age of subjects for 
this study was 18, this developmental-type change would not be apparent in 
the present work. 
Over-all, a significant r=-.23, p <.0009, was found to obtain between 
incarceration status (never arrested, erstwhile, prisoner) and CPI Self-
control. Self-control (CPI) did correlate negatively, but not significantly, 
with amount of arrests in all subjects who had been arrested at any time in 
their lives (r=-.26, p <.18, erstwhiles; r=-.07, p <.56, prisoners). This 
indicates self-control diminishes as incarceration status increases in 
severity (never-arrested were rated 1; erstwhiles, 2; prisoners, 3). Self-
control was obviously higher, even although not significantly, in the 
erstwhile group than in current prisoners. Since self-control, like 
impulsiveness, does differentiate criminal groups from noncriminal groups, 
it would be expected that self-control or its lack would be an important 
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factor in remaining out of prison once released. If this were true, then 
those who are currently in prison would have relatively low self-control 
scores and relatively high impulsiveness scores (which they do). Koreover. 
it would be expected that the erstwhile group would have a strong positive 
correlation between time since release and self-control, and a strong 
negative correlation between time since release and impulsiveness <which 
they do, although not significantly>. Refining measurements or 
operationalizations should produce significant correlations. For example, 
subjects in the erstwhile group were unbalanced in amounts of time since 
release, with seven (25%) of the 28 having one year or less since last 
release and the rest range up to 30 years. Further, these subjects differed 
in individual amount of previous arrests (which was shown to be a 
significant factor in this study and equates with "past history of 
offending"). Such an interpretation is supported by the finding of 
significant correlation between incarceration status and self-control. 
As to Hypothesis Number One, instrument intercorrelations indicate that 
risk-taking and impulsiveness are indeed related concepts, but not as 
closely as language might imply. Support for the theory of relatedness was 
found in the significant intercorrelations between the CPI Self-control 
measure, the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire, volunteering behavior, 
Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness, the JPI Risk-taking measure, and 
cigarette smoking behavior. The propensity to make less risky choices (the 
CDQ-type instrument) was found to increase as CPI Self-control increased 
(r=.17, p <'02). Volunteering behavior decreased (r=-.16, p <.03) and 
Venturesomeness decreased (r=-.12. p <.08) as CPI Self-control increased. 
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Cigarette smoking decreased as CPI Self-control increased (r=- .20, p < .006). 
Risk-taking, too, decreased as Self-control increased (r=-.28, p <.000l). 
Impulsiveness had the highest correlation with Self-control (r=-.58, 
p < .0001). 
While all these measures covaried, some did so more powerfully or more 
significantly. While both impulsiveness and risk-taking correlated with 
self-control at the .0001 level, impulsiveness did so at the ratio of -.58, 
while risk-taking correlated at the rate of -.28. This reflected a similar 
but much stronger influence or relationship between impulsiveness and self-
control than between risk-taking and self-control. Curiously, risk-taking 
correlated at exactly the same level and rate with impulsiveness as it did 
with with self-control. Also, risk-taking was found to correlate with 
volunteering over all subjects at r=.18, p (,01, and the correlation between 
risk-taking and cigarette smoking was r=.16, p < .03. However, when 
analyzed by groups, risk-taking did not significantly correlate with 
volunteering behavior or smoking, except in the case of the erstwhile group 
whose results showed extremely high correlations. Those results were r=.75, 
p < .0001 for risk-taking and volunteering, and r= .40, P (,04 for risk-taking 
and smoking. Risk-taking was quite strongly positively correlated with 1-7 
venturesomeness, which did not correlate significantly with 1-7 
impulsiveness. 
The related CDQ-type instrument significantly correlated negatively 
with impulsiveness (r=-.24, p <.002), suggesting that as impulsiveness goes 
up, there is a decrease in the degree of certainty about outcome preferred 
by the subject. 
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Importantly, the JPI Risk-taking scale does not significantly correlate 
with incarceration status. In other words, there is no significant 
relationship between risk-taking and criminality, while there is a highly 
significant relationship between impulsiveness and criminality as well as 
self-control and criminality. 
The CPI Self-control scale and the 1-7 Impulsiveness scale appear quite 
closely related. Volunteering behavior and results of the CDQ are almost 
identical, that is volunteering behavior decreased .17 for each year of age, 
and the CDQ score (higher indicates more caution) increased .17 for each 
year of age. 
Cigarette smoking emerged as a definitive correlation both with age and 
with incarceration status. One curious finding concerning smoking was that 
it was shown to increase with age. but (importantly) self-control was found 
not to increase with age. Yet as Self-control increased, smoking decreased 
(r=-.20, p <.006). This finding might reflect the greater incidence of 
smoking in a generation inundated with health-threat publicity only after 
they had formed positive associations and a chemical addiction. 
Nevertheless, this study did find that over all subjects, smoking behavior 
decreases as self-control increases (r=-.24, p <.003). Most curiously in 
this regard, while impulsiveness was found to significantly diminish with 
age only in the never-arrested group, that was the only group where 
increased age correlated with increased smoking. 
One argument or explanation posits that smoking might not indicate the 
same impulsiveness associated with greater criminal involvement. This 
argument maintains that smoking could be caused or facilitated by being in 
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jail. A counterpoint to that suggestion is that cigarette smoking was 
measured in this study by amount of cigarettes smoked per day. The logical 
probability was that prisoners had less money and therefore less 
cigarettes. This was supported by the numerous prisoner reponses reporting 
that they smoked six or ten cigarettes per day. In other words, the 
prisoners reported more exact (less than a pack) numbers of cigarettes 
smoked per day. Indeed, the range of responses to this item were as 
follows: never-arrested group, 0-30 cigarettes were smoked daily; erstwhile 
group, 0-40 cigarettes were smoked daily; prisoner group, 0-60 cigarettes 
were smoked daily. A second counterpoint to the argument that jail causes 
or facilitates smoking was that smoking was found to increase with age in 
the never-arrested group, but not in the erstwhile group, who had been in 
jail, but now were not. Extending this second argument, smoking did not 
decrease according to time since release from prison or jail. 
Another behavioral measure of impulsiveness, volunteering, could also be 
argued to occur at a higher rate in prisoners than nonprisoners due to 
reasons other than impulsiveness or risk-taking. Examples are boredom, or 
a desire to cooperate based on a belief that some good will come to the 
participant. To be considered in this regard is the position of the 
volunteer-request item. It is the first item on the questionnaire. More 
than half of the subjects in the prisoner group missed the first portion of 
the questionnaire because of the general confusion at the beginning of 
those sessions. The volunteering section likely was overlooked since 
experimenter instructed late-comers to "skip the first portion," because it 
contained the timed material, hoping it could be done later. It was 
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impossible to administer the timed portion on these occasions, and no 
directions were given to attend to the volunteering section. If a subject 
did not mark either of the choices of future experiments, it was counted as 
not vOlunteering. Despite this, volunteering behavior discriminated 
prisoners and nonprisoners, making this all the more convincing an outcome. 
In all of the non-prisoner groups, only two subjects missed the first 
portion <students in the early morning air-conditioning class who came in 
late). As a result, it seems that volunteering nonprisoners are certainly a 
more accurate representation of their groups' volunteering behavior 
<significantly lower) than were the amount of volunteering prisoners. 
It was noted that all the above measures differentiated prisoners from 
nonprisoners except the CDQ-type instrument and the JPI Risk-taking scale. 
This outcome supports the contention that risk and impulsiveness measures 
explore distinctly different phenomena. Impulsiveness might be conceived 
of as being a special case of risk-taking or, probably more correctly, as a 
special case of risky decision-making. One logical interpretation, given 
the strong correlations discovered, is that one is necessarily risky if 
impulsive; however, one is not necessarily impulsive if risky. Intelligence 
may prove to be a critical third factor in this relationship. 
• f * 
Self-control, volunteering behavior, impulsiveness, venturesomeness, and 
cigarette smoking differentiated prisoners from nonprisoners. strongly 
confirming the substantial influence of impulsiveness on criminal behavior. 
Some important findings of this research extend those conclusions by 
allowing strong inferences of causality. As part of the results from all 
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these measures found to differentiate prisoners and nonprisoners, the 
erstwhile group's mean scores fell right in between the two. This 
circumstance suggests progression, or a developmental sort of incrementing 
perhaps, and supports the causal inference that impulsiveness influences the 
degree criminal behavior. Further, changes in these impulsiveness scores 
are, by extension, causally associated with changes in incarceration status. 
Impulsiveness was found to increase in both the prisoner and erstwhile 
groups when the number of arrests reported increased. What this indicated 
was that individuals with the highest impulsiveness also had been arrested 
the most often. This finding helps counter the argument that prisoners all 
might have tried to give an impression of being "bad" since it held in the 
erstwhile group as well. 
Another support for causal inference was the very weak but firmly 
negative in direction finding (r=-.25, p <.22) that impulsiveness decreases 
in the erstwhile group as the amount of time since last release increases. 
Since it can be argued that jail causes impulsiveness, the reverse of this 
paper's position, it is helpful to highlight that when consider~ng prisoners 
(with no time elapsed), impulsiveness significantly diminishes with time 
elapsed since having been in jail (r=-.22, p <.02). Further supporting 
impulsiveness as a cause of criminal behavior is the finding of its 
significant increase as the amount of times one has been in jail increases 
Cr=.26, p <.0004). The possibility of a reversal of the suggested causal 
direction is disarmed by the consideration of how one could have come to 
be incarcerated in the first place in that case. 
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There is a final argument for the causal influence of impulsiveness on 
criminality. This is the finding in the never-arrested group that 
impulsiveness diminished as a function of age (r=-.32, p <.02), but not so 
in offender groups. This strong relationship incidentally implies that 
impulsiveness follows a developmental process (at least that its 
diminishing does, and that is the primary focus of inquiry). The 
importance of this finding and this interpretation is underlined by the 
fact that in the other two groups this "developmental" relationship did not 
obtain. 
The result of performing analysis of variance (ANOVA) computations on 
the results from each incarceration-status group on each measure was that 
volunteering behavior, self-control (CPI), Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness 
(1-7), and cigarette smoking were all found to significantly differentiate 
prisoners, erstwhiles, and never-arrested subjects, while the CDQ-type risk-
preference questionnaire and JPI Risk-taking failed to differentiate them. 
One probable meaning of these findings is that since prisoner and 
nonprisoner populations drastically differ in the areas under study, 
especially impulsiveness, findings about risk-taking or impulsiveness 
obtained with from a nonprisoner population cannot be generalized to 
prisoners and likely, to criminals. This seems quite important for 
rehabilitation efforts and, as well, for prevention, because while isolating 
impulsiveness as a critical element of criminal behavior, also emphasized is 
the fact that much of what is known about impulsiveness has been found 
using noncriminal populations and may not be generalizable. 
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Especially important are the findings of this study for their 
implications concerning child-raising. The taming of impulsiveness and the 
instilling of self-control are the very business of parenting, and the 
findings of this present study highlight this parenting task as never 
before in its crucial importance in the prevention of crime . 
• • • 
A major idea addressed by this paper was that "age," as crime's 
strongest correlate, was a poor predictor or explainer, and that more 
accurate factors or variables existed. In the present study, correlations 
were computed between age and all measures of impulsiveness and risk 
utilized. Computations of the covariance between age and incarceration 
status were also performed. Further, The results of AHOVAs performed on 
the age of subjects in the three groups showed there were no differences. 
This condition was intentional. The nonprisoner subjects for the study 
were selected to be closely matched to prisoner populations in age, 
education, racial distribution and socio-economic factors. 
Imp.ortantly, no measure utilized in this study except cigarette smoking 
found any differences due to age when considering all sUbjects. However, 
when results were analyzed by group, age was found to be a major factor in 
decreasing impulsiveness in the "normal", or noncriminal, group. However, 
there were numerous findings of the relationship between impulsiveness and 
criminal behavior. Thus was Hypothesis Number Three supported: 
Impulsiveness and risk-taking describe criminality better than does the 
factor of age. 
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I-tests were performed on results of the Self-control and Impulsiveness 
measures to superficially test for racial differences. Significant 
differences were found, supporting Hypothesis Number Four which stated 
there were such racial differences in the qualities explored in this study. 
The finding of racial differences on impulsiveness measures simply implies 
the need for more culturally specialized research and, likely, more cultural-
specific interventions in the field of rehabilitation and prevention. In 
each case, the Black population was found to reflect significantly higher 
self-control and significantly lower impulsiveness. 
Hypothesis Number Five was that dissimulation would be found to occur 
at a higher rate in prisoners than in the other two groups. This would be 
an important finding because of its implication that test or research 
results from one population could not be accurately generalized to the other 
population and, as well, that interventions <rehabilitative or preventive) 
also might not be generalizable. That findings from prisoners would 
contain distortions due to dishonesty is a logical hypothesis since these 
men are being punished for dishonesty at the time they are being tested. 
Ihis means that data and interpretations should be attempted only after 
some form of data checking is done. The Infrequency scale is a model for 
indications that a subject has answered dysfunctionally. It is suggested 
that all data from such a subject would become questionable and should be 
discarded, or at the least handled separately. Correlational computations 
found a significant relationship between incarceration status and Infrequent 
responses (r=.15, p <.04 before high-Infrequent responses were removed and 
r= .25 t p < .0009 after they were removed). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Since most studies cited, as well as the current one, utilize data 
from male subjects, the pronoun "he" will often be used generically in this 
paper. 
2. Rowe and Tittle (1977) investigated propensity to crime in a normal 
population while most criminal studies surveyed convicted criminals. The 
Rowe and Tittle results showed criminal propensity followed the same shape 
of data as arest rates, age-wise. Youthful inexperience has been considered 
as one possible explanation of the low mean age of incarcerated criminals. 
The logic involved is their inexperience could cause them to make mistakes 
a more experienced, and probably older, criminal would not make. 
Consequently they would be more likely to be incarcerated. The criminal 
propensity peaks, age-wise, in the over-all "norma~n population matches 
those of arrest-incarceration reports. This suggests that the high rate of 
young prisoners may accurately represent the age groups actually involved 
in crime. 
3. The crime clearance rate is the clearance of a reported crime by a 
criminal justice disposition. This means that some persons arrested will 
be found to be responsible for more than one reported crime, thus clearing 
several; on other occasions several persons are arrested in clearing one 
crime. 
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STATEMENT TO BE READ TO SUBJECTS PRIOR TO HANDING OUT MATERIALS 
For the purpose of finding answers that can help young people who are 
beginning to get into trouble, I am doing some personality research on 
people who have had problems with the law at some time in their lives. If 
you have never been arrested, your information is valuable in another way. 
I will not be able to tell you exactly how the information you give will be 
used until all the testing is done and the results are analyzed. This will 
take several months. 
The information you give will be used to write the thesis I must 
produce to complete my work on a master's degree in psychology and it is 
hoped that the results can be used to improve our system of corrections. I 
need you to answer over 100 questions openly and as honestly as you can. 
Some of the questions will ask about the way you usually think or feel. 
Hardly anyone thinks or feels exactly the same all the time, so answer 
these the way you USUALLY feel. I want you to remember that on this type 
of questionnaire, there is no such thing as right and wrong. The questions 
ask about things that almost everybody does or feels at some time, and all 
people are different. Some questions will ask you to think pretty hard. 
Some will tell you about a situation and ask you to make a choice about how 
you would handle it. 
If any of the questions appear appear tricky, I want you to know they 
are not intended to be. If you re-read that question I hope it will 
become more clear. But if you still feel it's tricky, just hold up your hand 
and I will come help you if I can. And also remember, at any time you are 
uncomfortable or wish to stop, you may do so. Some questions will be 
repeated. This is because several different types of tests were used, and 
some of them had the same type of question on them. The timed portion is 
very short. Getting a mental block when you are under time pressure is 
common, so don't feel badly if this happens to you. Most people cannot do 
very much in the short time you will be given, so don't feel like you didn't 
do well. 
I cannot pay you in any way for your participation. The only reward 
you will get is knowing that your answers are important, and they will be 
used to help others who need it. 
If you have a question at any time during the testing, just hold up 
your hand and I'll come answer it if I can. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE I HAND OUT MATERIALS? 
REMEMBER: THERE ARE NO RIGHT ANSWERS AND NO WAY YOU CAN GIVE A 
WRONG ANSWER, AND YOU CAN PUT IT DOWN AND LEAVE ANY TIME YOU WANT TO. 
- 106 -
V?IUl1t(,(",; arc nr..'cdc-J fr~r two I}[ -r)fTlln'J prorosco sludlf's. 1111..' [lloSt y.'J 1 J 11''''('r,,-
t 1'1?t(.' 'i '1' ldlll9 L('b'l\'~or and VC)J :ntr:-cr sUb]C"cts 'o.d 11 r1,]y til(l p,lrl of 'F'r,l;lcrs 
~'Iln "'-'1 ~ t lIe able to Wln (and k.eep) reasonable ;'\mounts of mone,)" ;""hilF' '-ll~o l"'iSK-
ln~ sllghtly palnful electric shocks if they lose. The second study ~lll 'nves-
tlgate elements of th~ personality 3nd will reguire sevpr~l hours of 'n-de~th 
pers~nDl'ty testing with questionnaires. If you would consider participating 
In either of these stud,es, please Indicate which study you w,ll be a~~ilable 
for so we can estimate how many persons 
might be willing' to participate. Thank you. 
Gambling Behavior Study _ Personality Study 
Each of the following items will require you to write as many answers ~s you can 
in a short period of time. Do not begin answering any item until time is called 
to begin, and be ready to stop when time is called to stop, even if you are in the 
middle of a word. Use the back if you run out of space. 
For a warm-up, the administrator will call time and you will have only 12 seconds 
to write the word "the" as many times as possible. Do not begin until time. 
1. Imaaine you have a carpenter's nail about four inches long. How m~ny uses can 
you think of for thi.s nail? Do not begin writing until time is called. (illin.) 
2. Imagine you are preparing to make a simple mechanical repair to your car. What 
things must you do first? Do not begin writing until time is called. (1 Hin.) 
3. Imaaine you have a candle which has been lit, placed in a candle-h0lder, and 
then set on a t"ble in the room you are now In. How many problems can YC'J think 
of that could possibly occur with this arrangement? \';ait to begin. (1 lIin.) 
4. lrranine you are preparing to '.·'ash your car. 110"" mo"y problems COil y'Ju tillnk 
of that could possibly occur to prevent your finishing tbe iob? Wait. 11 Min.) 
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1. ,... I'"'''rsun l1C'l'ds to '·sl'o .... : ("Iff" a littll~ no ...... an(l tl'en. T F 
2. hdVC had. very peculinr and. strange experiences. T r 
3. a~ often sald to be hotheAded. T ~ 
4. sometimes pretend to know more than I really do. T F 
5. Someti~es I feel like smashing thinqs. T F 
6. "ost people would tell a lie If they coule' cain by it. T F 
7. I thlnk I would enioy havinq authority over other peonle. T ~ 
8. I finc' it hard to keep my mind on a task or iob. T ~ 
9. I have sometimes stayed away from another pe~son because feared doinq or 
sayina something that I might regret afterwards. T F 
10. Sometimes 1 feel like swearing. T F 
11. I like to boast about my achievements every now and then. T 
12. I must admit I often try to get my own way reqardless of what others maY 
want. T F 
13. Someti~es I think of thinos too bad to talk about. T F 
14. I would do almost anything on a dare. T F 
15. I like to be the center of attention. T r-
16. I would like to see a bullfight in Soain. T F 
17. At times I feel like picking a fist fight with someone. T F 
le. Sometimes I have the same dream over and over. T F 
19. I do not always tell the truth. T F 
20. I fall in and out of love rather easily. T F 
21. would like to wear expensive clothes. T ~ 
22. consider a matter from every standpoint before I make a decision. T F 
73. have strange and peculiar thoughts. T F 
24. Yy home life was always haopy. T F 
25. I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think. T F 
26. ~y way of doin~ things is a~t to he misunderstood by others. T F 
27. I never make judgments about people until I am sure of the facts. T F' 
20. nost people are secretl" nle~5eo ..... hen SOmeOJ1A pl~p (.'I~tB i,...t-,... trt"'lnrle. T r 
29. Sometimes I feel as if I must injure elther myself or someone else. T' 
30. I often do whatever makes me feel cheerful here and now, even at the cost 
of some distant goal. T F 
~1. I can remember "playin~ sick" to grt out of somethina. T F 
~~. I think I would like to fight in a boxing match sometime. T F 
~3. I like to go to parties and other affairs where there is lots of loud fun. T r 
34. I have frequently found myself, when alone, pondering such abstract orohlems 
as f r eew ill, ev ii, etc. T F 
35. I keep out of trouble at all costs. T F 
36. I am apt to show off in some way if get the chance. T r 
37. am often bothered by useless t~ouqhts which keep running through my mind. 
T F 
3R. must ac'mit that I have a bad temper, once I get angry. T f 
3 0 • like laroe, noisy parties. T f 
40. often feel as thouq~ I have done something wrona or wicked. T ~ 
41. am a ~etter talker than a listener. T F 
42. Sometimes I rather enjoy qoinq~qilinst the rules and doinq thinos I'm not 
sUDposed to. T F 
43. I have very few quarrels with members of my family. T r 
44. I have never done anything danqerous for the thrill of it. T F 
45. I used to like it very much when one of my ~aners was reac to the class in 
school. T F 
46. I feel that I have often been punished without cause. T F 
47. I would like to be an actor on the stane or in the movies. T ~ 
48. At times I have a strong urge to do somethin~ harmful or shocking. T 
49. I often set feelings like crawlino, burning, tinaling, or. "ooing to sleep" 
in different parts of my body. T P 
50. Police cars should be especially marked so that you can al~ays see trem 
coming. T F 
Sex M F Current Age Race 
Last ~chool grade completed 1 5 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS I~' 
If you have ever been arrested, please give your age as best you can 
the time of each arrest. lst_____ 2nd ~rd 4th ____ _ 
rcmC'",bc r, i1 t 
Last 
If you were sentenced On any arrest, how long has it been since you were last 
released? Years _____ Months Presently Incarcerated 
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4. Fnr r~ur p~rsonal best health, how man~ cigarettes do you feel are the 
maXlmum you should smoke? ________ Packs 
5. IIhat is your current weight? ____ pou"ds 
6. How many pounds do you feel you are overweight? ____ pounds 
7. Before the seat belt law was passed, what percentage of the time when you 
were in a car did you use your se~t belt? per cent 
8. WhAt per cent of injuries from auto accidents do you think could have been 
either prevented or lessened if the individual had been wearing a seat belt? 
______ per cent 
Please circle the T if the statement is true for you most of the time, or most 
rpcently; circle the F if the statement is not true for you most of the timc, or 
most recently. 
1. When I want something, I'll sometimes go out on a limb to get it. T r 
2. Of the people I know, I like some better than others. T F 
3. I rarely make even small bets. 'T F 
4. My musical compositions have been played in concert halls around the 
world. T F 
5. I would enjoy bluffing my way into an exclusive club or private party. T F 
6. 1 have had at least one cold in my life. T F 
7. If I invested any money ill stocks, it would prObably only be in safe stocks 
from large, well known companies. T F 
8. I have sometimes hesitated before making a decision. T F 
9. If the possible reward was very high, I would not hesitate putting my money 
into a new business that could fail. T F 
10. I have sight in only one eye. T r 
11. When in school, I rarely took the chance of bluffing my way through an 
assignment. T F 
12. I have no sense ol taste at all. T F 
13. People have told me that I seem to enjoy taking chances. T F 
14. I have kept a pet monkey for years. T F 
15. Skindiving in the open ocean would be much too dangerous for me. T F 
16. In my lifetime I have eaten at least one meal in a restaurant. T F 
17. The thuu1ht of investing in stocks excites me. T F 
18. Some things don't turn out exactly as I plan them. T F 
19. I rarely, if ever, take riSks_when there is another alternative. T F 
20. I have won trophies in professional golf tournaments. T F 
21. I enjoy taking risks. T F 
22. I run five miles every day to keep healthy. T F 
23. I would prefer a stable position with a moderate salary to one with a 
higher salary but less· security. T F 
24. I eat imported cheeses with all my meals. T F 
25. Taking risks does not bother me if the gains involved are high. T F 
26. I can eat most foods without feeling ill. T F 
27. I consider security ah important element in every aspect of my life. T F 
28. I have made several trips overseas to study old ruins and rock formations. 
T F 
29. would enjoy the challenge of a project that could mean either a promotion 
or loss of a job. T F 
30~ I do some things better than others. T F 
31. I try to avoid situations that have uncertain outco~e5. T F 
32. believe there are some jobs which I would not enjoy doing. T F 
33. think I would enjoy almost any type of g~mbling. T F 
34. can walk a few blocks without getting too tired. T F 
35. would participate only in business undertakings that Bre relativrly 
certain. T F 
36. Everyone in my family has the s~mc birthday. T F 
37. In games I usually "go for broke" rather than pl~ying it safe. T }" 
38. All jokes seem pointless to me. T F 
39. I probably would not take the chance of borrowing money for a busin n ,,<; 
deal even if it might be profitable. T F 
40. I usually sleep at least four hours every n1ght. T F 
(IF THERE IS NO CHAliCE YOU WOULD ADVISE OR PARTICIPATE IN WHAT TilE ITErI I~SKS, 
YOU MAY MARK ZERO. ZERO MEANS NO CHANCE OF ACTING ON THIS ITEM.) 
1. Mr. A. has a job workin~ for the City making $6 an hour with good security 
and benefits, including pension. Mr. A. 's long-time friend has just started a 
new business that looks promising, and he believes it is possible to make a 
great deal of money. He has asked Mr. A. to quit his job with the City and 
come work with him as his equal partner. If the business goes, Mr. A. will 
make a lot more money than he could at the City, but if it fails he will have 
lost his secure position. Imagine you are to advise Mr. A. On a scale of 
o per cent to 100 per cent, how sure must you be of the success of the new 
business to advise Mr. A. to go for it? 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
2. Mr. B. has been told by his doctor he has a bad heart. He has two mnjor 
choices of '<hat he can do to survive. One is to change almost everything in 
his life--his workload, eatino habits, social life, and more--all of \;hi:::h 
are quite difficult to change: His other choice is to have an operation ",hlCh 
wil~ correct the problem, but thcre is a chance he will not ~urvive the orcra-
tion. Imagine you are to advise Mr. A. On a scale of 0 to 100 per cent, how 
sure of success must you be to advise him to have the operation? 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
3. Mr. C. has done you an injustice. As you try to make him repair thn dam-
age he resists and causes you further damage. You find yourself shortl) after 
this in a position to spread a destructive rumor about Mr. C., which could 
hurt him professionally. However, since the rumor is untrue, your disco~cry 
as the source of this rumor Vlill be very embarrassing and you could be sued 
by Mr. C. On a scale of 0 to 100 per cent, how sure of success must yOl1 be 
to spread the rumor? 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
4. D. is captain of his football tea-. It is the last few seconds of Ihn big 
game of the year against their rlval school. D. has the choice of call1n1 a 
play that is almost certain to produce 3 points for a tie game, or 3 rlly 
which could produce a touchdown and sure victory, but sure defeat if it r.isses. 
Imagine you are advising Q. On a scale of a to 100 per cent, ho\; sure nf suc-
cess of the touchdown play must you be to advise him to go for it? 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
5. On your job as a computer operator with a larqe firm you h3ve ~iscc~ered 
there is an account where your company deposits customer refunds until they 
are claimed. You are able to transfer money from til" refunds account t'J i-our 
own account for short periods of time in order to draw interest on it amount-
ing to a very large sum of money over time. If you are caught you will lose 
your job and possibly have charges filed against you. On a scale of a to 
100 per cent, how sure of success must you be to move the money? 
a 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
GENERlIL HEALTH ASSESSNCNT 
1. On a scale of 0-10, rate your present health. __________ _ 
2. On a scale of 0-10, rate your recent energy level. __ _ 
3. 11m" ma-y cigarettes do you sll'oke FPr day? Packs 
I:..? Ai~ __ _ 5ex __ _ 
!i'IST~UC:!Gtl5: Please iiill'I!i .... ~r' ':!len ~uest1on ~y put~~n;; a cl;",cl'! 
aI')und t!1e "V::S" or the "~'O" Co:ll0· .. 1n& ~he quest!on. ther~ 3.!"''! 
no right or · ... rong &l'\s·"er-'5. a.nd no tricK ques-=:..ons. 'Mork ~uickly 
a...nd do not t:-ttM ':00 1-:::0; 3boUt ehe !:xac': ::1eanin. of :h'! ~ue!5ti~n. 
Pl1:ASE ~E:'E:'1l£~ T:l A"S·M!:l! ~ACH QUESrrOI'l 
1. would you e"\Joy .ater skiing? 'l!3 
2. USl,.,ially do Y"u ?r~f~r to s';lck to orands you know are 
rellabi~. t::J ':ryir.g ne'" ones on t;!,,\e chane'! or Cind1ni 
!lomeo:hlng b~tte:"'" "(!S 
). '.Quld you [~~l sorry for a lonely s:rang,'!r" '!!S 
.:1. 00 you o:ulte en~oy ':akl::g; risks? Y~S 
5. 00 Y'"'u oft:~~ i"!'t emotionally lnvoL'/ed .... lth your friends' 
j)r'Jbl~("1~"} Y!S 
6. I~ould you ~nJoy parad"lu'::e jurn;l1.ni" YES 
7. 00 you often buy things on impulse? ______________________ ___ '!!S 
8. 00 unhappy people · ... ho are SOI":"y (~I" themseLve5 1I"r1tat~ you? ns 
9. 00 you g~ner'S11y :!o and say things 'Wi'::r.out stopping to think" YES 
10. Ar~ you in::llned to g~t nero/au, ... ~~n. att:ers around you se~m 
to b~ ne r·/')\J' ":' _______________________________________ ___ Y::S 
11. Do fOU o(t~n get into a jam because you do things ·.d.thout 
th!.n~i~~'" Y~S 
12. 
13. 
t<1. 
00 you t;~lnk ~i":c:"'.hi\d.r.g is too c:!a...o;geC"::Jl..s a "'3,/ to trav~l '? __ y::s 
Do y~u fin':1 it 5111y fcr p"!op1e ";~ c::y o\,!t of happiness" ___ '{E:S 
00 you like dl't!.ng off ";hl! hlih-:ca:-1: V::S 
15. 00 p"!co1e 'Iou. '!!r~ "ith have a 't:---::n; tn(l~e~ce on your moods'" Y!:S 
t6. Are you an l:"oul~i'/e per-son., _________________________ _ ES 
17. DQ you "lI"!lC:Jme re.r and exct":1rg ~'(;:e:-!en-:e5 .!.:1d sensaticns, 
1f "hey 'lr~ a Itt':::le fr!..t'"':~r:.!.:"g and un,:on'/"!nt:ional"' ___ YES 
t8. Or')~'3 L':: a[t"ect you v'lI!r'J much .r.en -:ne of your friends Se<e:TIs 
'J~~~':'" Y~S 
~o '(au ·.!su~lly thlr:k careflJ!ly ':e1"::r'! doing anything? YSS 
20. .~'.lld (au like to l'!'aC'n to fly 3..n a~!""-=plar.e" Y!5 
21. 0.., /'Ju ·'''~r ~~t de~pty L!"I'/'Jt'/~1 .!:h ':~.e feelin~s of a 
c:tar'lc-:~:- !.n ,., f11m, play or novel "' ___________________ _ 
22. 01') y'JU of'=~n do ':hinq'" 'In th~ S='''::- cf th~ mOf""ien';., ______ _ 
2] .., .' .... " ~·t '.-:j' _;:~et ~;"' • ., I C:."! ;":,,-~-="~ '::-j'" 
YES 
YES 
~ 1 c)'J Y"'u s..:rT'q .. -:~ ... ·5 fi.:v:i ~"'T·-:~,,! ~:5,! '1 :3'..!~~':e!"' ':atchi:--,~., _______ '(£5 
2c). J'l ;'0'.1 11<1':':'~,/ :; ....... ,( ,q~'-.0';': ~:':.""':-; ':~!.n~'1 ?'J':", _______ _ Y2S 
2~ . C>') Ie'! )f': .... ~ ~~': ~n'/')t·/~rj ~~ -:: ... :..~~s :CtJ tlt::~:'"' od.sh J"JU -:~'l:~ 
&~': 0' .. ': 0(-' (ES 
27. Ct) y'Ju ~~t ~a '=3r:-!'~d a ... ay· ':/ --:e. ~!""=1 o!x::!.tini l:!-eas, tr.a': JI)'.J 
n~'Jer" ':hLnk of ~(,s!iLble s"1a;;;~ .. _____________________ __ Y!:S 
23. 00 ylJIJ. [tn<j i': r.a:-d ':0 un-1"':-s':a:",.~ :"lI!cpte · ... h"=l rtsk t~"!lr n~-::"-3 
c ti'TIb l '"lit - "un ': a 1:-:, ., _____________________________ _ YES 
2'1. Lm y?U rn"l<~ d~-:isLt')n~ .. l::10u': --:::-:"/1r.; lbou": oth~r P~');:.I~·"I 
("!'e 1 i;l~~ ., '{':S 
\ 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
~tO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
riO 
NO 
110 
NO 
NO 
~JO 
~IO 
NO 
tlO 
tiD 
rio 
WI 
NO 
:10 
NO 
riO 
riO 
NO 
'10 
'/1. 
30. Do you .ometime. like dolr.~ ~hing~ that are , blt 
friihtenlng' ______________________________________________ __ ·~3 
31. 00 yoU need to use a lo~ of se!(con~r~t to ~eep out of 
troubl.? __________________________________________________ __ '{E:S 
32. 00 you become mor~ irritated t~an sympathetic ~hen you 5~~ 
sem~~ne cr1~ ____________________________________________ ___ 
YES 
33. ~ould you agree that almost everything enJoY3ble i~ llle~31 or 
immoral? YES 
34. Ge!'1.e-rslly do you prefer to enter cold 5ea '.tater gr'1cuall!. 
to diving or jumping .traiiht in' Y~S 
35. Ar'! you o(~en surprised at pecple's reaction!! to '.hat 1-:1U do 
or say" V::S 
36. Would you enjoy the sensation ~f sxilng very fast do~n ~ ~ig~ 
~ountaln51ope., ____________________________________________ _ 
37. Do you like watching people open pC'e!!ents?~ ________________ _ 
~e. Do you think an even ina out is more succes3ful if i: ~s 
39. 
4.~. 
.!l. 
42. 
unplanned ~r arr~ged at the l&5~mcnent? ____________________ _ 
~ould you li~e to go .cuba divlng' ________________________ ___ 
'.IIould YO'J. f1.nd l t very hard to br~e.k ~ad ne· .... ~ to S07.e'Jne " __ 
INO'Jld you er:Joy fast dr1.vi~~? ____________________ _ 
Co y~u ug~ally ~ork quickly, ~l~~cut bothering to chec~? 
43. Do you often chang. your inter.9ts' ________________________ __ 
4.4. 8'!(:I["~ r.'Iak1ng up YOLr:nind. do you consij,!f'" all ":h~ 3.rj·Ja:1':')~~s 
and di9a~v3ntag~s' ________________________________________ __ 
45. Can you a~t very 1nteC'~5ted in your fri~nds' pr~o!~~s'" 
.16. · .. ould you like to go pot-holi~g' 
47. ~ould you be put off a jab invol~ing quit. a ~It of d\n~.r' 
v;:s 
ns 
YES 
'{C:3 
Y1:S 
YES 
'[ES 
Y~S 
YE3 
vss 
"I:S 
~8. 00 you pr~r~r t~ 'sl~e? on it' befor~ making d~c:'5L~n3~ Y~S 
413. 'When people shout at you. d" you shout back? __________ _ YES 
50. Do y~u (e~l sorry for ve~'J shy peopl.' ____________________ ___ ns 
Sl. Ar~ y"u happy when you ar~ ' .. it~ a cheerful ~r')L:p .:!nd s~'j .... h~n 
the .,th~rs ar~ gtum? _____________________________________ __ YES 
52. 00 you usually :"ak~ up Y':'J:--ninc QlJ.ickly.., _________ _ YE:; 
53. Can you imBgtne ~h3t l~ ~ust be like to b~ v~ry l~na~y'" YC:S 
54. OO~5 tf: 'lIorry you ' .... h,.n '"I~"''!r~ ,:- .. '1l')'['-::'y~:1.~ <!or, ~ ;:ln~(.:'- .... ~ __ _ (ES 
PLEAS;: C,EC;( TO SEE THAT "{O') f'A·'E AII'S~cPcJ ~LL THe CIJ:ST:~:IS 
:10 
NO 
NO 
~IO 
~O 
~IO 
NO 
~o 
NO 
~:o 
':0 
:10 
tlO 
110 
rio 
:IC 
LO 
riO 
1:0 
'") 
NO 
N'J 
UCJ 
~jO 
'10 
rl 
rl 
r-' 
!:IFE~~TIOtl Cf'ECK LIST 
F,1ch it,,, below IS a goal or necd th~t 
T_!l~_lll"UJT in each of these 1 a person can have, Rale how you "tand liT 
-- --- goa s or needs St u th ' 
n1l1'1 SIIl,'C nllsllnucrst"ndillg it Cln k . u \' e kcy c"refully l;efore heqin-
,..",11r 1"<-,111. ' mel e your ans"'ers say the opposite of what you 
~: ~ :~u~~t:~~!e~ w~th thl~ way things are right now. 
l, I 100 1d I'k a a a 1ttle better than I om right 
4 u - e to a lot better than I am right now 
now. 
. I feel I am totally deprived of this right now. . 
Clothes 
School Qr Vocational Training 
DC,inq somethi ng useful in "ociety 
L/,tertainment facilities at home 
Se~f-confldence 
;-lut0r10blle 
Spending tloney 
Love Life 
Self-acceptance 
,Job 
Membership in Groups 
Social Skills 
------ ---
----- -~~-
On a scale of 0-10, rate the followino jobs according 
would like to have that particular job. If you would 
hieh number is placed in the blank to the left of it. 
like the job at all. 
to how well you think you 
like a job very much, a 
Zero means you would not 
Policeman Construction Contractor 
Doctor Priest or Minister 
~i~h School Teacher Test Pilot 
Now rate how difficult you feel it would be for you to get each job. This in-
cludes how difficult you feel it would be for you to get the training required 
for it. Use the 0-10 ratinq scale where 0 means it would not be difficult at 
all and 10 means it would be impossible for you. 
Policeman Construction Contractor 
Doctor Priest or ~inister 
lIigh School Teacher Test Pilot 
